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Acceptable Lies in Contract
Negotiations
Prof. Dr. iur. Stefanie Jung, M.A. (CoE) *

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is well established that lying is a widespread phenomenon in business-tobusiness (èB2Bæ) contract negotiations.1 Some of the most prominent lies may be
those about the subject matter of the contract. However, negotiators also frequently
lie about other aspects like offers from other potential buyers or sellers, the availability of their product, the legal situation regarding contractual aspects, as well as
their emotions and preferences.
Most, if not all, legal systems regulate the aforementioned lies to some extent.
Every legal system must draw the line between legal and illegal lies in consideration
of the many factors of negotiations, such as economic and moral arguments, differences in legal culture, the Rechtsgefühl (sense of how the law should be), and purely
legal arguments. Some legal systems, including German law, are particularly strict
and forbid almost all kinds of lies.2 Other legal systems are more lenient, like U.S.
law, which leaves some room for interpretation.3 This article demonstrates that the
economic analysis of the effects of lies in B2B contract negotiations justifies treating some lies as lawful.4 Non-economic arguments, like morality, that may justify
* Professor of Corporate Law, Technical University of Munich, Campus Heilbronn, School of Management and Visiting Fellow of the CLI (New York University School of Law). I would like to thank Richard Epstein (NYU), Saul Levmore (Chicago), Holger Spamann (Harvard), Richard Brooks (NYU), Curtis Milhaupt (Stanford), Ariel Porat (Tel-Aviv), Peter Krebs (University of Siegen) as well as Mario
Rizzo (NYU), Charles Delmotte (NYU), Jonathan H. Choi (NYU) and all the participants of the Colloquium on Market Institutions and Economic Processes (NYU), all the participants of the EALE in TelAviv, and all the participants of the AsLEA in Bangkok for their insightful and inspiring comments, and
Melissa Dowse (University of Siegen) for her help writing this paper in English.
1. See infra Part IV A discussing frequency of lies generally. See also infra Part VII for a discussion
of specific types of lies.
2. For a discussion of applicable German law see Stefanie Jung, Bluffing in Business-to-Business
Contract Negotiations, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 973, 988-92 (2019). Section 123 of the German Civil Code
requires an intentional deception and a causality. All lies that fulfill these requirements allow the deceived party to rescind the contract. There are only minor exceptions to this rule. See CHRISTIAN
ARMBRÜSTER, 1 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 123 marginal no. 1105 (8th ed. 2018) (Munich Commentary on the Civil Code). See also HOLGER WENDTLAND,
BECK’SCHER ONLINE KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB, § 123, para. 1-24 (55th ed. 2020) (Beck Commentary on
the Civil Code).
3. For a comparison of German and U.S. law, see e.g.¸ Jung, supra note 3.
4. This paper does not address deceptions in business-to-consumer (B2C) negotiations because many
legal systems provide special rules for B2C cases to counterbalance the structural disadvantages of consumers. Also, negotiations in the framework of a legal process are not addressed in this article. This
paper assumes the existence of negotiations and therefore does not discuss the economic effects of the
negotiation process itself. Criticizing the negotiation process form a welfare point of view, see ARTHUR
C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 201-03 (4th ed. 1932) (arguing for limiting negotiations, but
admitting the impossibility of an absolute prohibition). Most legal systems do not regulate lying in the
private sphere, such as lying to ones’ spouse or neighbor. See Bryan H. Druzin & Jessica Li, The Criminalization of Lying: Under What Circumstances, If Any, Should Lies Be Made Criminal?, 101 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529-73 (2011) (favoring criminal sanctions for èegregious lying causing serious
harmæ).
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limitations on dishonesty, are not addressed in this article. Therefore, the absence
of an economic justification for legal rules sanctioning certain deceptions should
not be equated with a recommendation to waive a prohibition of those lies.
The analysis of the economic effects of lies is not novel. So far, these effects
have been considered intensely, focusing primarily on various complex economic
approaches.5 This article examines the central economic approaches in their entirety, including transaction cost and allocation efficiency,6 which paints a complete
picture of the economic consequence of deception, crucial to finding an appropriate
legal solution.
Existing economic analysis regularly discusses either lies as a uniform phenomenon or establishes a rough classification of different ètypes of lies.æ For example, the comparison of productive and distributive information, white lies/paternalistic lies, and harmful lies.7 An ultimate conclusion of this article is that the
economic analysis of deception in contract negotiations necessitates distinguishing
even more precisely according to what the negotiator lies about. This means that
there should be a distinction, for example, between lies about the price, performance, offers from other providers, and availability of products. An international
study conducted by the author and Peter Krebs (hereinafter the èSiegen Studyæ)8
that received more than 3,000 responses from 13 different countries9 regarding people’s sense of morality10 and their Rechtsgefühl supports this idea of distinguishing
more precisely according to the subject of the negotiators’ lie. 11
This article proceeds in seven parts. Section II provides an overview of the
current discussion on the economic analysis of lies in B2B contract negotiations.
Section III introduces the types of lies that lead to different economic effects. Section IV briefly considers the interrelationship of moral, legal, and economic effects,
as well as the interdependencies of these aspects with the frequency of lies. Section
V discusses the different economic approaches and lines of reasoning that can be
5. See infra Part II.
6. Previous studies have been devoted to individual types of lies or large case groups or have dealt
with individual economic effects.
7. Cf. Manfred Tietzel, Zur ökonomischen Theorie des Betrügens und des Fälschens, 204
JAHRBÜCHER FÜR NATIONALÖKONOMIE UND STATISTIK, no. 1, 1988, at 17 (dealing with lies about the
contract object in general); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-122 (9th ed. 2014)
(discussing fraud generally); Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, A Welfarist Perspective on Lies, 91 Ind. L. J.
617 (2016). (discuss anti-abuse lies, truth revealing lies, and paternalistic lies). See also Saul Levmore,
Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 137-142 (1982)
referring to Kronman’s differentiation among types of lies.
8. Some of the basic results of this study have been reported in Jung¸ supra note 2, at 973-1003.
There, the author focused on differences in evaluations of lies between Germans and Americans. Further
results will be published in Stefanie Jung, Das Rechtsgefühl im Vertragsrecht, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT,
issue 4, 378, 378-419 and Jung & Krebs & Leszczyjska, Does it matter what people lie about? Work in
progress (asking if it matters what negotiators lie about by presenting empirical evidence on people’s
moral and legal beliefs).
9. USA, China, Russia, Germany, England, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Argentina, Colombia, Italy,
Poland, and Ukraine.
10. DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH: TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN ORDINARY LIFE,
203 (1993).
11. As neither of the English terms èsense of justiceæ or èsense of unlawfulnessæ are exact translations
of the German term, I have opted to use èRechtsgefühlæ throughout this paper. German literature
distinguishes different forms of the èRechtsgefühl.æ See, e.g., ERWIN RIEZLER, DAS RECHTSGEFÜHL.
RECHTSPSYCHOLOGISCHE BETRACHTUNGEN 6-25 (1946); FRANZ-XAVER KAUFMANN, Rechtsgefühl,
Verrechtlichung und Wandel des Rechts, in JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE,
185-99 (1985).
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applied to the different types of lies in contract negotiations. Section VI explains a
baseline scenario and comparison scenario for the economic analysis of the different types of lies, while Section VII explores the specific economic consequences
for four selected types of lies. Section VIII contains the conlucions of this article.
To sum up the most important finding: There are lies which do not produce
negative economic effects. In some instances, bluffs may even bring about a marginally positive outcome. At least from an economic point of view, such lies should
not be prohibited. The analysis also demonstrates that there are circumstances
where lies result in economic welfare losses. However, in some of those instances,
the current law cannot mitigate the negative effects of lies effectively. Hence, the
law should also not prohibit such intentional lies. The lawmaker should only intervene, if lies produce negative economic effects and the law is able to mitigate them.
Overall, the result is that lawmakers should differentiate between harmful and
harmless lies and in line with this between lawful and unlawful lies.
The analysis utilizes a uniform understanding of èlie.æ Hereinafter, the term
lie refers to an intentionally false statement which does not coincide with the facts.
Moreover, the deceiver must also have intended to deceive the opposite party.12 For
this reason, this article only considers intentional lies and leaves out negligent deceptions. Furthermore, this article focuses on èactiveæ lies—intentionally incorrect
statements—and not on lies by omission or by misleading acts. The terms èlie,æ
èdeception,æ èmisrepresentation,æ and èbluffæ will also be used synonymously.

II.

STATE OF DISCUSSION ON THE ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF LIES
IN B2B CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS

The general negotiation literature extensively explores lies in contract negotiations and addresses numerous different deceptive tactics and techniques used by
negotiating parties.13 Yet, the relevant literature focuses merely on tactical and strategic aspects of lies and does not explore their economic effects.14 Another area of
12. See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING – MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 13-14 (1999);
Nyberg, supra note 10, 50 (èTo sum up, then, we can say that lying means making a statement (not too
vague) you want somebody to believe, even though you don’t (completely) believe it yourself, when the
other person has a right to expect you mean what you say.æ); PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES 28 (1992)
(èIn my definition of a lie or deceit, then, one person intends to mislead another, doing so deliberately,
without prior notification of this purpose, and without having been explicitly asked to do so by the target.æ).
13. Cf. STEFANIE JUNG & PETER KREBS, DIE VERTRAGSVERHANDLUNG – TAKTISCHE, STRATEGISCHE
UND RECHTLICHE ELEMENTE 471–73 (2016) (topic list: Irreführungen) [hereinafter Jung & Krebs, Die
Vertragsverhandlung]. In Die Vertragsverhandlung, Jung & Krebs list 38 different tactics and techniques: distracting maneuver, all I’ve got, ambiguous authority, argumentative exaggerations, bait and
switch, better offer, biased choice, big pot, bluff, bogey, brer rabbit, budget limit, cheap talk, deliberate
error, disinformation, faking, false deadline, foggy recall, funny money, information overload, empty
promise, last chance, ambiguous formulation, missing person maneuver, padding, phony facts, posturing, pseudo misunderstandings, red herring, apparent connectedness, scrambled eggs, similar-to-me tactic, snow job, tactic of the small quantity, trivializing, presenting a false legal view, limiting options, and
interjection. See also STEFANIE JUNG & PETER KREBS, THE ESSENTIALS OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
(Melissa Dowse trans., 2019) (2019). [hereinafter Jung & Krebs, Essentials of Contract Negotiation].
14. On tactical and strategic aspects of bluffs in contract negotiations without discussing economic
consequences see, e.g., Jung & Krebs, DIE VERTRAGSVERHANDLUNG 471–73 (2016) (topic list: Irreführungen with references to the different tactics); LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE
NEGOTIATOR, 195 (2014); JACK, NASHER, DEAL!, 42-4 (2013) (on lies about the BATNA); AMIRA
GALIN, THE WORLD OF NEGOTIATION, 129 (2016).
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research addresses the circumstances in which people tend to deceive and specifies
situations in which they speak the truth.15 Beyond that, there are numerous publications on ethical and legal aspects of deceptions that frequently discuss the relationship between morality and law.16 Moreover, the Rechtsgefühl (sense of how the
law should be) regarding lies in contract negotiations and the interdependence of
this Rechtsgefühl and law have been stressed occasionally.17 While this extensive
body of literature does not address the economic implications of lies, it provides
insights into how, when, and why deception occurs in negotiations and the interdependencies of morality, Rechtsgefühl, and the law.
Lies are also examined from an economic perspective, though the literature is
more limited in this area compared to other aspects of deceptions. The economic
literature focuses on whether certain lies should be permissible or not.18 Authors
who justify some kinds of lies also speak of èoptimal dishonesty.æ 19 A larger part
of this literature addresses the distinction between disclosure duties and the right to
remain silent.20 These contributions rarely address deception directly. However,
the insights gained by their examination provide the basis for discussing whether
lies are necessary for protecting the right to remain silent. 21 This discussion concerns the advantages of lies, which are otherwise rarely examined. Possible positive
15. Studies, for example, suggest that the use of tactics based on deception depends on how respondents evaluate these tactics ethically. See, e.g., Roy J. Lewicki & Robert J. Robinson, Ethical and Unethical Bargaining Tactics: An Empirical Study, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 665, 669 (1998); Joseph T. Banas &
Judi McLean Parks, Lambs Among Lions? The Impact of Ethical Ideology on Negotiation Behaviors and
Outcomes, 7 INT’L. NEGOT. 235, 251–52 (2002) (concerning false promises, misrepresentation, and misuse of information). Scholars have also found differences by gender, nationality, ethnic origin, level of
education, religious beliefs, work experience and personal attitudes to negotiation. See, e.g., Lewicki &
Robinson, supra, at 678 (nationality); Richard A. Maier & Paul J. Lavrakas, Lying Behavior and Evaluation of Lies, 42 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 575, 576 (1976) (educational level and religious attitude); James S. Leming, Cheating Behavior, Subject Variables, and Components of the Internal-External
Scale under High and Low Risk Conditions, 74 J. EDUC. RES. 83, 86–87 (1980) (discussing cheating
instead of lying, and how sanctions have different effects on the cheating behavior of men and women).
16. See generally Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW &
PHIL. 393 (2003); Fritz Allhoff, Business Bluffing Reconsidered, 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 283 (2003); Robert
S. Adler, Negotiating with Liars, 48 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 69 (2007); Thomas L. Carson et al., Bluffing in Labor Negotiations: Legal and Ethical Issues, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS 13 (1982); James K. L. Lawrence,
Lying, Misrepresenting, Puffing and Bluffing: Legal, Ethical and Professional Standards for Negotiators
and Mediation Advocates, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 35 (2014); RALPH BACKHAUS, Ethik und Recht
in Cicero, de officiis 3.12.50 ff., in HUMANIORA MEDIZIN—RECHT—GESCHICHTE 3 (Kern et al. eds.,
2006) (discussing ethics according to Cicero); Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARV.
BUS. REV. 143 (1968); Thomas Carson, Second Thoughts About Bluffing, 3 BUS. ETHICS Q. 317 (1993)
(the last two providing a moral/ethical perspective).
17. Jung, supra note 3, at 973–94.
18. Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception and then of Common Law Categories, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1359, 1366 (2007) (è[I]t is the fact that deception is sometimes acceptable and sometimes not that makes
the subject interesting.æ).
19. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 7, at 137; Levmore, supra note 18, at 136. But see HOLGER
FLEISCHER, INFORMATIONSASYMMETRIE IM VERTRAGSRECHT 261–64 (2001) (rejecting this idea). The
present paper does not aim to offer a determination of the economic optimum of lies in contract negotiations. Hence, the term is not adopted hereinafter.
20. This issue is not addressed in this paper. For an in-depth analysis of this issue see e.g. Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978);
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 357 (2016); Steven Shavell, Acquisition and
Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 THE RAND J. OF ECON., 20 (1994), see also STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 331-34 (2004).
21. See, e.g., Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 625–31; Levmore, supra note 7, at 137–42; FLEISCHER,
supra note 19, at 261–64.
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effects are occasionally dealt with in the context of anti-abuse lies, paternalistic lies,
and truth-revealing lies.22 However, the debate centers around very specific types
of lies and so can only be transferred to B2B contract negotiations to a limited extent.
In most instances, the literature focuses on the negative economic effects of
lies and applies the transaction cost theory and arguments of the cheapest cost
avoider.23 The literature also examines the negative effects of lies on the truth signal
and trust.24 However, the effects of lies on the Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement (èBATNAæ)25 and the Zone of Possible Agreement (èZOPAæ) 26 have
received very little attention, though the BATNA and the ZOPA serve as key indicators of bargaining power and the possible area of agreement. In response to this
gap in research, this article will discuss this matter in greater detail. 27
The literature also focuses on welfare economics,28 and especially on allocation
efficiency.29 On the whole, the economic approaches are examined in detail. The
relevant contributions usually focus on one approach, like lies protecting the right
to remain silent, and analyze it in depth. However, this article deals comprehensively with the economic considerations to draw overall conclusions for an appropriate legal solution to the problem.

III.

TYPES OF LIES

This section discusses various types of lies, and the types of lies addressed here
will later be analyzed regarding their different economic effects. Economic approaches often treat lies as either a uniform phenomenon 30 or they adopt a rough

22. See e.g., Porat & Yadlin, supra note 8, at 633–61.
23. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 122. Both approaches will be discussed in detail. See infra Sections V. A, V. B.
24. See, e.g., Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 631. The effects on the truth signal and trust will be
discussed in detail. See infra Section V. C.
25. Parties consult their BATNA to determine whether the concrete, negotiated contract is relatively
reasonable in comparison to other options for action. JUNG & KREBS, ESSENTIALS OF CONTRACT
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 13, at 41. The importance of negotiation alternatives was already fundamentally emphasized in 1950 by John F. Nash. John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA
155, 156 (1950). The term èBATNAæ and the significance of negotiation alternatives were mainly developed by Roger Fisher & William Ury. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 104 (1981);
see also JUNG & KREBS, ESSENTIALS OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 13, at 40-41 (explaining
that Roger Fisher and William Ury originated the term èBATNAæ).
26. ZOPA stands for zone of possible agreement, i.e. the bargaining range. Within this zone, the contract is economically reasonable for both sides. Michael A. Wheeler, Negotiation Analysis: An Introduction, HBS NOTE # 9-801-156, 1, 3 (2000); JUNG & KREBS, ESSENTIALS OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS,
supra note 13, at 171. In 1982, Raiffa coined ZOPA as a basic term in negotiations. Id. at 56–58; see
also JUNG & KREBS, ESSENTIALS OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 13, at 171 (explaining the
definition of the term èZOPAæ and attributing its coinage to Howard Raiffa).
27. See infra Section V. C.
28. Porat & Yadlin even take up welfare economics in their title: A Welfarist Perspective on Lies.
Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 617.
29. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 11–12 (1978) (explaining that the importance of quickly relaying information to the market for
society’s general welfare); see also Levmore, supra note 7, at 134 (explaining that disclosure should be
compelled when it would result in economic efficiencies).
30. Cf. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 17–34 (describing lies about the contract object in general); POSNER,
supra note 7, at 118–22 (describing fraud generally).
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differentiation according to different types of lies.31 Here, the latter approach of
deconstructing lies will be used systematically and will be further developed. The
proposed differentiation draws on the findings of the Siegen Study on lies in business negotiations.32 The Siegen Study demonstrated that, with regard to their moral
intuition and, above all, their Rechtsgefühl, individuals differentiate on the subject
matter of a negotiator’s lies.33
As this research ultimately aims to find a suitable legal solution, a clear and
comprehensible distinction between different types of lies will have a greater
chance of being implemented and enforced. Moreover, a meaningful typification
of lies helps to categorize individual cases and increase legal certainty.34 The following compilation of types of lies is not exhaustive but provides an overview. The
degree of differentiation follows the potential differences in justification, even
though different types of lies can certainly show the same results. 35 Furthermore,
the types of lies are chosen in a way that even non-lawyers and non-economists can
find the classifications to be meaningful. However, in individual cases, it could
pose a difficulty to define the boundaries between different types of lies. For the
economic analysis, this is less relevant than for legal implementation.36 Therefore,
in the following, typical examples are chosen for each type of lie without delving
deeper into the issue of clear differentiation. Finally, this section will focus on facts
,including inner facts. The challenges associated with opinions and intentions and
related inner facts will be discussed in Section IV.37
Lies about the subject matter of the contract. Typical examples are misrepresentations by suppliers concerning their products. However, under certain circumstances, there may also be deception on the part of the buyer about the supplier’s product, such as the often-cited example of undiscovered oil under a piece
of land that is for sale.
Lies about the price. A distinction must be drawn between lies on the price
in a narrow and a broad sense. Lies about the price in a narrow sense include those
lies about price components, while incorrect statements about a èspecial priceæ or a
èmates’ rateæ or a Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price (èMSRPæ) count as lies
about the price in a broad sense. Practically relevant are also lies about cost prices,
31. Literature distinguishes e.g. between productive and distributive information and white lies and
harmful lies. See among others Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 633–61 (describing different kinds of
lies such as anti-abuse lies, truth revealing lies, and paternalistic lies); Levmore, supra note 7, at 137–42
(describing Kronman’s differentiation).
32. See JUNG, supra note 3, at 977–83 (publishing some initial results, with detailed analysis of the
data to follow).
33. The results vary greatly depending on what the lie is about. For example, 41% of German professional negotiators consider a bluff of a seller about an alternative offer immoral and 18% advocate a
right to rescind the contract. In contrast, 76% deem a lie about the subject matter of the contract immoral
and 80% advocate a right to rescind the contract. A deception about personal preferences (football club)
is considered immoral by 31%, yet, only 6% of the surveyed German professional negotiators advocate
a right of rescission. See e.g., Jung, supra note 3, at 982.
34. With regard to the other attempts to categorize lies (e.g. productive vs. unproductive lies and casually acquired information/deliberately acquired information), the problem of actually assigning specific
misrepresentations to one of the categories was the main point of criticism. See Kronman, supra note 29,
at 17; Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 57, 66 (1992); Levmore, supra note 7, at
141.
35. However, it is possible that there are still different justifications within a single type of lie, which
necessitates a more detailed differentiation.
36. At this juncture, the legal formulation will not be addressed.
37. See infra Section IV.
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profit margins, and purchase prices. Such lies might be the calculative basis of the
price or merely used as an argument in the negotiations. In the first case, they are
part of the price formation and accordingly of the price in a narrow sense, otherwise,
they are only a part of the price in a broad sense.
Lies about the identity and characteristics of the negotiation partner. The
negotiation partner can deceive about his or her identity. Moreover, this type of lie
also involves deceptions about the characteristics, especially competencies, of their
own company, e.g. about their compliance with ethical standards, a certain code of
conduct, or their performance. This also includes the deceptions of the negotiator
about the financial situation of his or her company.
Lies about the BATNA. As the BATNA significantly influences negotiating
power, it is regularly the subject of bluffs. Negotiators sometimes lie about how
attractive their alternatives are. A buyer may mention another, more attractive offer
in order to negotiate better terms, and it may even be the case that one party tries to
deceive the other party about their BATNA.38
Deceptions about emotions. This concerns deceptions about sympathies and
antipathies regarding aspects of the negotiation or circumstances outside of the contract, such as the party’s favorite football club and political opinions. These lies are
used to create the impression that the parties share similar emotions and thereby
make use of the similar-to-me-effect.39 These deceptions are also used in B2B negotiations to build a good relationship with the other party. In addition, deceptions
about emotions concerning persons who belong to their own negotiating team are
possible. Bluffs are about emotions during negotiation are very common, for example, faked dissatisfaction with the opposing party’s offer or irritation about the
opposing party’s negotiation style. Some, but not all lies about emotions can be
classified as white lies. White lies serve as a èsocial lubricantæ and are designed to
enable a harmonious interaction, particularly in the business sphere. 40
Lies about external circumstances. These lies do not relate to the contract,
and could include factors such as the inflation rate in a country and incorrect statements on the base rate.
Lies about the negotiation process. This includes lies which are about internal approval systems41 or the requirement to complete a nondisclosure agreement
before the commencement of negotiations.
Lies about time-related aspects. This, for instance, encompasses lies about
the availability of certain persons, sometimes called èmissing person maneuver,æ42
as well as wrong deadlines,43 and departure times.
38. According to the understanding given here, deceptions about the market situation constitute a separate category.
39. People have a tendency towards finding people more likeable who are similar to them. This similarity can be related to age, gender, origin, hobbies, and political attitudes. See Greg J. Sears & Patricia
M. Rowe, A Personality-Based Similar-to-Me Effect in the Employment Interview: Conscientiousness,
Affect- Versus Competence-Mediated Interpretations, and the Role of Job Relevance, 35 CAN. J. BEH.
SCI. 13 (2003) (discussing the similar-to-me effect in job interviews).
40. See also Victoria Talwar & Angela Crossman, From Little White Lies to Filthy Liars: The Evolution of Honesty and Deception in Young Children, 40 ADV. IN CHILD DEVEL. & BEHAV. 139, 150 (2011)
(noting that è[s]uch [prosocial] lies . . . could be considered the oil that greases the wheels of everyday
social interactionsæ).
41. In this context, one tactic is known as èambiguous authority.æ See Jung & Krebs, DIE
VERTRAGSVERHANDLUNG, supra note 13, at 206–07.
42. Id. at 269.
43. Id. at 90–91.
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Lies about interests and preferences. Negotiators often bluff about the interests and preferences of their side regarding the current negotiations. In negotiation
literature, such deceptions are discussed under the terms -bogeyæ or èpadding.æ44
However, an agent acting as a negotiator can also deceive about their own interests
and preferences regarding the current negotiations.
Lies about substantive requirements and instructions. Bluffs concerning
the substantive requirements and instructions of their side may arise in principalagent situations.45 Typical bluffs include false statements on budget limitations
(èall I’ve gotæ).46 Misrepresentations about specifications from third parties are also
possible.
Lies about the legal framework. In this respect, it is primarily a matter of
deceiving about the lawfulness or unlawfulness, the necessity of approval or legal
consequences of particular actions, as well as lying about the probable outcome of
court proceedings or the existence or non-existence of provisions.47
Lies concerning the implementation or fulfillment of the contract. The focus here is on bluffs about the ability to fulfill in good time and otherwise as contractually agreed. Deceptions about the performance of the contract are also covered by the scope of warranty law.
Lies about availability. Suppliers may lie about the availability of their products.48 This also includes lies about the availability on the market like èunique itemæ
or èrare collector’s item.æ Finally, there are deceptions about the availability of
third-party services, such as third party financing.
Lies about the general market situation. This category is closely linked to
deceptions about the BATNA. However, this type of lie includes the special feature
that there is no direct deception about the actual BATNA, but rather a more general
deception about the overall market situation and expected market development (i.e.
the dynamics).

IV.

INTERDEPENDENCIES OF VARIOUS FACTORS

The economic analysis of the different types of lies is highly complex due to
the interdependencies of four different factors: the moral, legal, and economic aspects as well as the different frequencies with which lies are used in practice. Frequency and economic interdependencies are the primary subject of this article and
are discussed in detail below. Moral and legal interdependencies are not the primary subject of this article, but for a better understanding, these interdependencies
will be briefly outlined in this Section and discussed where necessary. In brief,
moral aspects include people’s moral beliefs, the moral concepts of philosophers,
the Rechtsgefühl, and the Judiz (sense of how the law is).49 Legal aspects include
44. Id. at 132–133.
45. On the principal-agent problem in contract negotiations, see Jan van Uden, Die unternehmerische
Verhandlungsvertretung als komplexe Prinzipal-Agenten-Problematik, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
KONFLIKTMANAGEMENT 216-20 (2018).
46. See Jung & Krebs, ESSENTIALS OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATION, supra note 13, at 26, 53–54.
47. Id. at 137–38.
48. One common tactic is the so-called ètactic of small quantities, see Id. at 158–159.
49. RIEZLER, supra note 11, at 6-25 distinguishes three forms of the Rechtsgefühl (1. Sense of how the
law should be; 2. Sense of how the law is; 3. Sense that only what corresponds to the law is to be done.).
For the second category I use the German term èJudiz.æ
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the legal rules, the enforceability of rights and claims, the probability of detection
and the possibility of evidence as well as alternative courses of action.
Each of the four aforementioned factors are influenced by other factors. The
frequency of lies, for example, is not only influenced by economic aspects, morality, the Rechtsgefühl, and the law, but also by gender, nationality, ethnic origin,
level of education, religious beliefs, work experience, and personal attitudes towards negotiation.50 Still, it is valuable to analyze some of the main interdependencies between the four factors to take them into account for the economic analysis.

A.

Frequency of Lies

In order to determine the overall economic effects of lies, it is crucial to know
the frequency with which professional negotiators deceive in business negotiations.
However, the frequency of lies in B2B contract negotiations has limited research.51
Studies regarding lies in everyday life reveal that èbluffingæ is a relatively common
practice,52 even though people claim to value honesty.53 Yet, bluffs usually concern
small, harmless lies, also known as little white lies. Such harmless lies in a social
context can also be expected in B2B negotiations.
Simulations conducted with students allow conclusions to be drawn about actual business practices. The simulations showed that in such negotiations students
lie relatively frequently, not only in the social context but also regarding substantive
aspects of the negotiation.54 These results must be viewed against the background
of further findings on deceptions: according to the Siegen Study,55 the use of certain
deceptive tactics in contract negotiations is considered morally acceptable.56 This
suggests that people would also be willing to apply such tactics in contract

50. See, e.g., Lewicki & Robinson, supra note 15, at 676 (describing how frequency of using lying as
a tactic varies by nationality); Maier & Lavrakas, supra note 15, at 576 (describing how frequency of
lying can be determined by educational level and religious attitude); Leming, supra note 15, at 86 (describing how sanctions have different effects on the cheating behavior of men and women).
51. Bruce Barry & Erin Rehel, Lies, Damn Lies, and Negotiation: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the
Nature and Consequences of Deception at the Bargaining Table, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 343 (Ayoko et al. eds., 2014) (providing an overview on the respective state
of discussion).
52. Bella M. DePaulo et al., Lying in Everyday Life, 70 J. PERS. & SOC. PSY. 979, 991 (1996); Candida
Peterson, Deception in Intimate Relationship, 31/6 INT. J. PSY. 279, 288 (1996) (on deception in intimate
relationships).
53. See Norman H. Anderson, Likeableness Ratings of 555 Personality-Trait Words, 9 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 272, 272-279 (1968) (finding people valued èhonestæ and ètruthfulæ on number 2 respectively
5, while èphonyæ and èliaræ were at the end of the list (554 and 555 respectively)).
54. Karl Aquino & Thomas E. Becker, Lying in Negotiations: How Individual and Situational Factors
Influence the Use of Neutralization Strategies, 26 J. ORG. BEHAV. 661, 670 (2005) (also focusing on
lying about certain aspects); J. Keith Murnighan et al., The Information Dilemma in Negotiations: Effects
of Experience, Incentives, and Integrative Potential, 10 INT. J. CONF. MANA. 313, 332 (1999); Maurice
E. Schweitzer & Rachel Croson, Curtailing Deception: The Impact of Direct Questions on Lies and
Omissions, 10 INT. J. CONF. MANA. 225, 225 (1999); Helmut Crott et al., The Effect of Experience on
Information Exchange and Cheating in an Asymmetrical Bargaining Situation, in GROUP DECISION
MAKING 356 (Brandstätter & Stocker-Kreichgauer eds., 1982).
55. Study on Bluffs in B2B Contract Negotiations, UNIVERSITY OF SIEGEN (Jun. 18, 2019)
https://www.wiwi.uni-siegen.de/contractgovernance/survey/?lang=de.
56. For preliminary results, see Jung, supra note 3, at 973-1001. Judges, lawyers, professional negotiators and students took part in the survey.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

9

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2021, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 6

264

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2021

negotiations.57 Put generally, people tend to comply less with rules if they do not
believe that those rules are morally justified.58 Therefore, moral beliefs seem to
influence the frequency of lies.
Studies also reveal that potential liars consider person-internal ècosts.æ Misrepresentations often lead to person-internal ècostsæ in the form of psychological
ècosts,æ so-called èlying costs.æ59 This is due to the so-called èhonesty norm.æ60 If
people violate the internalized honesty norm then lying costs arise, which can manifest as a negative self-image.61 In the brains of liars, the amygdala and the right
anterior prefrontal cortex are generally active.62 This provokes emotional stress and
feelings, such as shame and guilt.63 These èlying costsæ primarily occur where the
deceiver cannot justify the lie to him or herself.64 Whether the liar can justify the
lie to him or herself depends on the moral evaluation of the deception, so lying costs
occur when a behavior is deemed immoral. However, as already mentioned, the

57. Shaul Shalvi et al., Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired Counterfactuals Modifies Ethical Perceptions and Behavior, 115 ORGAN. BEHAV. HUM. DECIS. PROC. 181, 182 (2011) (stating that people
resort to bluffing when they can justify the deception to themselves).
58. Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do Sanctions Really Deter?, 17
L. & SOC. REV. 457, 462 (1983) (èWeak beliefs in the moral validity of rules make conformity less
likely.æ).
59. Johannes Abeler et al., Representative Evidence on Lying Costs, 113 J. PUB. ECO. 96, 96 (2014);
see also Maurice E. Schweitzer, Deception in Negotiations, WHARTON ON MAKING DECISIONS 187, 192
(Hoch et al. eds., 2001).
60. See e.g., Gerald J. Pruckner & Rupert Sausgruber, Honesty on the Streets: A Field Study on Newspaper Purchasing, 11 J. EUR. ECO. ASSOC. 661 (2013) (examining the èhonesty normæ with regard to
buying newspapers èwhere payments are not monitoredæ).
61. Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45
J. MKTG. RES. 633, 634 (2008).
62. See, e.g., Nobuhito Abe et al., Deceiving Others: Distinct Neural Responses of the Prefrontal
Cortex and Amygdala in Simple Fabrication and Deception with Social Interactions, 19 J. COG.
NEUROSCIENCE 287, 292 (2007). Also, other areas are activated when people lie, e.g. the anterior cingulate cortex. Id. at 293. See generally Nobuhito Abe, The Neurobiology of Deception: Evidence From
Neuroimaging and Loss-of-Function Studies, 22 CURRENT OPINION NEUROLOGY 594 (2009); How the
Brain Shapes Deception: An Integrated Review of the Literature, 17 THE NEUROSCIENTIST 560 (2011);
Matthias Gamer, Detecting of Deception and Concealed Information Using Neuroimaging Techniques,
in MEMORY DETECTION: THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEALED INFORMATION TEST, 101-03
(Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar & Meijer eds., 2011 (giving an overview on the neurobiology of deception);
see also Thomas Baumgartner et al., Who Is Honest and Why: Baseline Activation in Anterior Insula
Predicts Inter-Individual Differences in Deceptive Behavior, 94 BIOLOGY PSYCHOL. 192, 195 (2013)
(concluding that èa high level of baseline activation in the anterior insula might predispose individuals
to be honest due to a hyperactive emotional system which would make a deceptive act too stressful and
bothersomeæ). However, studies generally show that brain activity is higher when people lie as compared
to when they tell the truth. This suggests that telling the truth is easier than lying. See Gamer, supra note
63, at 97. The amygdala is also active in people who are lied to, i.e. victims of deception. Cf. Julie Grèzes
et al., Amygdala Activation When One Is the Target of Deceit: Did He Lie to You or to Someone Else?,
30 NEUROIMAGE 601, 601 (2006); Julie Grèzes et al., Brain Mechanisms for Inferring Deceit in the
Actions of Others, 24 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5500, 5502 (2004). Another study found that the left temporoparietal junction shows greater activation when people detect anti-social lies. See Tokiko Harada et al.,
Neural Correlates of the Judgment of Lying: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 63
NEUROSCIENCE RES. 24, 30 (2009).
63. Cramton & Dees, Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics, 3 BUS.
ETHICS QUARTERLY 375, 375 (1993) (mentioning all negative feelings as the result of lies). See also
Schweitzer, supra note 59, at 193.
64. Shalvi, supra note 58, at 181-89; see also Maurice E. Schweitzer, Deception in Negotiations,
WHARTON ON MAKING DECISIONS 193 (Hoch et al. eds., 2001).
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Siegen Study demonstrates that the use of certain deceptive tactics in contract negotiations is regarded as morally acceptable.65
The Siegen Study also shows that even if respondents regarded deceptive tactics as immoral, they did not favor legal consequences in all cases. 66 That professional negotiators generally adopt a particularly generous attitude regarding morality and the Rechtsgefühl67 is a further indication of the widespread practice of lies
in B2B negotiations and of a possible interdependency between the Rechtsgefühl
and frequency of lies. Further, negotiation literature describes misleading tactics as
an indispensable skill of good negotiators,68 which confirms the presumption that
deception in B2B negotiations is widely used. This result is also evident, insofar as
negotiations yield countless possibilities for bluffs. Negotiators have to choose between truth and deception in each instance.69 Moreover, many of those lies promise
considerable advantages and are paired with a relatively low risk of being detected.
Taken together, it can be concluded that certain deceptions are a customary practice
in business negotiations.

B.

Cost-benefit Ratio

Moreover, the frequency of lies depends on the cost-benefit ratio.70 The costbenefit ratio is largely defined by the risk of disclosure71 and the possible negative
consequences of disclosure.72 The risk of disclosure varies depending on the type
of lie, such as lies about the availability of a product, alternative offers, or the legal
situation.73 The possible negative consequences also vary regarding the different
types of lies. 74 This depends on the reaction of the deceived person, as well as the

65. Jung, supra note 57.
66. Id. at 979, 983.
67. The majority of German professional negotiators, for instance, consider seven of the (previously)
nine examined scenarios to be morally acceptable, while the majority of German students rate only four
of the (previously) nine scenarios as morally acceptable. Id. at 978. The majority of German professional
negotiators favor legal consequences (the right of rescission in the specific case) in only one case (and
with 46% favor of legal consequences in a second case). Among German students, the majority favors
legal consequences in two cases (and 45% in a third case). Id. at 982. Further results of the study will be
discussed in greater detail as part of the individual types of lies (see Section VII.). See also Id. at 977–
983. At the moment, the study is expanding and will cover even more relevant scenarios.
68. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, When Is It Legal to Lie in Negotiations, 32 SLOAN MGM’T. REV. 93,
93 (1991) (èCommercial negotiations seem to require a talent for deception.æ); James H. Michelman,
Deception in Commercial Negotiation, 2 J. BUS. ETHICS 255, 255 (1983) (è[D]eception often seems to
be an unavoidable characteristic of negotiation.æ).
69. è[I]I submit that a careful examination of the behavior of even the most forthright, honest, and
trustworthy negotiators will show them actively engaged in misleading their opponents about their true
positions.æ James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 5 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927 (1980).
70. See also Cramton & Dees, supra note 63, at 376 (noting that people tend to use deception for their
own benefit).
71. See also THE WHARTON SCHOOL, ET AL., WHARTON ON MAKING DECISIONS 191 (Hoch et al. eds.,
2001). I wasn’t sure what the Schweitzer section looked like without actually seeing the source.
72. See THE WHARTON SCHOOL, supra note 72, at 192 (mentioning legal and reputation costs).
73. Cf. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 2326 (on information asymmetries and the higher incentives to deceive
when they exist). On the types of lies, see below Section VII.
74. See also THE WHARTON SCHOOL, supra note 72, at 192 (Hoch et al. eds., 2001) (one-off negotiations).
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reaction of individuals that are aware of the deception, and the market as a whole.75
The deceived party, even without entitlement to pursue legal or contractual claims
has a repertoire of recourses at his or her disposal. Avenues of recourse include
renegotiation, replacement of the deceiving negotiator, counter-lies, altering negotiation behavior, compensation in follow-up transactions, ending the business relationship, or damaging the liar’s reputation.76 These alternative actions are effective,
even in cases where the lie is only discovered after the contract is finalized. 77 As a
result, these actions deter deceptions because they increase the costs for the deceiving party. Rational negotiators will weigh the costs and benefits of applying these
alternative actions. Renegotiations, for example, increase transaction costs, while
accusing the other side of using deceptive tactics risks fracturing long-term business
relationships.78 Difficulties associated with the detection and proof of deception are
less crucial for alternative courses of action than legal sanctions because real èevidenceæ is often not required to apply social sanctions. In many cases, even the
suspicion of a lie can justify the application of alternative courses of action.
In permanent business relationships and interconnected economic communities, social sanctions, such as including reputational damage,79 are especially severe.80 Whether social sanctions are put into action will depend on the moral assessment of the deception and the Rechtsgefühl, because parties can only choose to
exercise social sanctions if someone violates a social norm.81 The development of
those social norms is influenced by morality and the Rechtsgefühl.82 In short, if
people believe that certain behavior is morally acceptable, they are less likely to
pursue social sanctions.83

75. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 28–29 (èAll aforementioned individual responses to fraud attempts have
a behavioral regulating effect on all parties involved; they increase the costs incurred by the fraud to the
fraudster, reduce indirect fraud costs to third parties, and reduce search and information costs for potential victims of fraud.æ) (translated from èAlle genannten individuellen Reaktionen auf Betrugsversuche
wirken verhaltensregulierend auf alle Beteiligten; sie erhöhen die Kosten des Betrugs für den Betrüger,
vermindern die indirekten Betrugskosten für Dritte und senken die Such- und Informationskosten für
potentielle Betrugsopfer.æ).
76. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 28-33 (identifying individual and collective response options, e.g.: objection, outflow of customers, quality review by consumer protection organizations, exclusion from other
jointly produced services).
77. Amar Bhide & Howard H. Stevenson, Why Be Honest If Honesty Doesn’t Pay, 68 HARV. BUS.
REV. 126 (1990) (claiming that many businesses do not retaliate when lied to).
78. See, e.g., Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 96 (on fraud dilemma).
79. For a classification of social sanctions, see Stuart Piddocke, Social Sanctions, 10
ANTHROPOLOGICA 261, 281 (1968).
80. See, e.g., William C. Johnson et al., Corporate Fraud and the Value of Reputations in the Product
Market, 25 J. OF CORP. FIN. 16, 39 (2014) (on reputation damages in the product market).
81. Piddocke, supra note 79, at 267 (èThe third method of reinforcing the normative order is that of
social sanctions. This is the provision of rewards for compliance with the norms (positive social sanctions) and of punishments for deviance therefrom (negative social sanctions).æ).
82. On the role of path dependencies with regard to social norms, see MICHAEL HECHTER & KARLDIETER OPP, SOCIAL NORMS 406-10 (2001).
83. Tobias Gössling, The Price of Morality - An Analysis of Personality, Moral Behaviour, and Social
Rules in Economic Terms, 45 J. OF BUS. ETH. 121, 124 (2003). However, it should be taken into account
that the moral evaluation will also depend on the fact if the behavior is judged from a neutral perspective
or if the person is the liar or the victim of the lie.
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Legal Claims and Rights

If the legal system grants the deceived party certain rights, the legal situation
will influence the frequency of lies. Like alternative courses of action, legal consequences will shift the cost-benefit ratio of misrepresentations. Notably, the effects
of the legal system hinge on effective legal enforcement.84 The higher the enforcement rate, the less attractive it will be to lie, which will lower the frequency of lies.85
It is important to note that enforcement depends on the concrete legal rules.
The most common legal consequences in private law are the right to rescind the
contract or contractual damage claims for intentional, causal misrepresentations. 86
Assuming that the deceiver behaves rationally, the more severe the sanctions, the
less deception occurs.
Additionally, the enforcement of rescission or claims for damages depends on
the availability of alternative courses of action. If there are effective and cheaper
alternatives, the deceived party will resort to an alternative, like renegotiations and
social sanctions. Regarding the decision between the enforcement of legal rights
and alternative courses of action, the parties’ relationship is a deciding factor. In
long-term B2B relations, the parties generally apply only alternative courses of action to avoid damaging the long-term relationship.

1. Detection and Evidence
The victim of deception can only enforce legal claims if he or she can uncover
the deception. Oftentimes, the uncovering of the lie initially causes transaction
costs.87 Whether the party will invest resources to uncover deception depends on
the cost-benefit ratio. The deceived party will consider the costs for clarification,
as well as the additional costs of enforcing the legally granted rights or the costs of
using alternative courses of action and the potential monetary recovery from successful enforcement.88 The transaction costs that occur diminish welfare and the
possible benefits of successful enforcement will often be limited. In cases of misrepresentations that lead to a different negotiation result within the ZOPA, 89 the
deceived party is rarely interested in a rescission, because he or she has no better
alternative to that deal. However, the deceived party might want to enforce damage
claims, but it might be difficult for the deceived party to prove his or her concrete
damages.
Detection and evidence gathering are the main barriers to enforcement of legal
remedies where deception taints negotiations.90 This is because judicial
84. Enforcement is understood in a wide sense in this paper. Therefore, enforcement is not only given
when a party enforces a right in court, but also if the party simply claims the right from the other party
referring to the legal situation and the other party complies.
85. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 30 (regarding criminal sanctions).
86. Possible criminal sanctions and tort law are not considered here. See generally, supra note 3, at
983-992 (giving an overview on U.S. and German law).
87. See more in detail below at V.A.
88. See Cramton & Dees, supra note 63, at 374 (explaining that reputational consequences must also
be considered. A juridical enforcement may not be worthwhile in individual cases, but it may deter possible negotiating partners from using such deceptive tactics).
89. See below Section V.C.
90. See Cramton & Dees, supra note 63, at 378 (èUnfortunately, the civil law is a rather blunt instrument for the enforcement of norms.æ).
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enforcement of legal remedies is only possible where deception is uncovered. In
this case, the deceived party must bear the difficulties associated with the burden of
proof.91 Lies concerning the subject matter of the contract and lies about the contracting parties can be proven at a reasonable cost.92 Additionally, written misrepresentations are often easier to prove than oral misrepresentations. For example, it
is easier and less expensive to introduce a written document during judicial proceedings than it is to examine witnesses. Therefore, when there is an oral misrepresentation, the parties possess a high degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome
of litigation. Such uncertainty deters the deceived party from pursuing litigation,
which lowers enforcement.

2. Enforceability of Rights and Claims
a. Opinions, Intentions, and Inner Attitudes
The enforceability of claims regarding false opinions is a particularly difficult
challenge. Opinions are generally neither èwrongæ nor èright,æ and thus a statement
of opinion itself cannot constitute a misrepresentation.93 But a person can deceive
a contractual counterpart as to whether he or she holds a certain opinion (èinner
factæ).94 However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove what opinion a person
holds, as this is known only by the person95 and because one’s opinions can change
over time. This complicates the possibility of proving that an opinion was held at
a specific point in time. The same applies to inner attitudes and intentions. 96 Due
to these problems of proof, it is challenging for a legal system to effectively enforce
a ban on such misrepresentations. Therefore, from an economic point of view, a
ban is generally ineffective at mitigating the negative effects associated with lies
about opinions, inner attitudes, and intentions. However, economic arguments are
only one of the arguments that lawmakers take into account.

b. Principal-Agent-Problems
Additionally, owners of companies rarely negotiate themselves, so they often
rely on agents to represent their interests, which might cause problems regarding
enforcement.97 In many situations, the deceived agent will avoid disclosing that he
91. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN ARMBRÜSTER, 1 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH: ALLGEMEINER TEIL § 123 marginal no. 94-95 (8th ed. 2018) (Munich Commentary on the
Civil Code on German law).
92. See on the subject matter more in detail below at VI.A.
93. See Jung, supra note 3, at 983-992 (addressing differing legal standards in Germany and the U.S.).
94. U.S. law regulates such lies. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 159(d) (1981).
95. Even if the deceiver tells his colleague that he lied about his opinion, the testimony of the colleague
cannot prove the lie for sure, because the deceiver could have also lied to his colleague. Only the deceiver
knows the truth and could potentially offer proof that he lied.
96. Regarding U.S. law, the following quote is regularly cited: èThe state of a man’s mind is as much
a fact as the state of his digestion.æ Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. 459, 483 (1885).
97. In negotiations, a principal-agent situation is given where a representative (agent) is commissioned
by the principal to conduct negotiations and, if necessary, to also conclude these negotiations. In this
respect, hidden characteristics, hidden actions, hidden knowledge, and hidden intentions are particularly
challenging. See, e.g., Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 138-41; Jan van Uden, Die unternehmerische
Verhandlungsvertretung als komplexe Prinzipal-Agenten-Problematik, 21(6) ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
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or she was deceived in the negotiation because deceived agents regularly lack the
incentive to do so. Agents seldom want to admit to their superiors that they have
been deceived and may have agreed to a less favorable contract, because their principal may regard this as a mistake and punish them. Thus, the behavior of the agent
will often prevent the enforcement of potential legal claims and the application of
alternative measures.

c. Errors in the Enforcement Process
It should also be considered that there may be errors in the enforcement process
of such legal claims. Lawyers may make a mistake in the submission of the facts
or may argue the law incorrectly, and courts may erroneously assess certain situations and render judgments that do not comply with the law. The degree of such a
risk depends on the clarity of the relevant regulations. In this respect, complex rules
are more susceptible to errors than standard rules. Likewise, broad, interpretable
formulations are more likely to result in legal uncertainty than clear and unambiguous formulations.98 In this respect, one cannot necessarily speak of èerrors.æ Rather, such rules entail a scope of justifiability in which one cannot speak of èrightæ
or èwrong.æ For the deceived side, however, uncertainty remains as to whether the
court will decide in his or her favor. As a result, whether claims are enforced depends, among other things, on the èerror rateæ of lawyers and courts and the uncertainty related to the scope of justifiability.99 In this regard, clear and secure legal
provisions are economically preferable because they minimize this effect.

3. Enforcement and Rechtsgefühl
The Rechtsgefühl may be particularly influential to actual enforcement. If the
law and the Rechtsgefühl do not correspond, the claim or legal right will be enforced
less frequently.100 The sense of what the law is, the so-called èJudiz,æ will also play
a significant role regarding the actual enforcement. The importance of the
Rechtsgefühl and the Judiz is illustrated particularly well by the example of the German legal system. German law grants the deceived party a right to rescind in almost
all cases.101 However, the aforementioned international Siegen Study demonstrated
that in many of these cases, the surveyed Germans did not favor imposing legal
consequences for deception.102 The Siegen Study also indicated that Germans
KONFLIKTMANAGEMENT 216, 216-20 (2018) (discussing the principal-agent-problem in contract
negotiations).
98. Levmore, supra note 7, at 141 (pointing out that in legal systems that permit èoptimal dishonesty,æ
the risk of errors would increase).
99. See id. (discussing that courts can err).
100. Cramton & Dees, supra note 63, at 371 (è[T]he parties must be willing to spend the resources
(time and money) to seek remedies.æ).
101. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], abstract § 123, para. 1, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/BJNR001950896.html (Ger.). (èA person who has been induced to make a declaration of intent by deceitÂmay avoid his declaration.æ) (German: èWer zur
Abgabe einer Willenserklärung durch arglistige TäuschungÂbestimmt worden ist, kann die Erklärung
anfechten.æ); see also Fleischer, supra note 19, at 264 (advocating the strict maintenance of a lie
prohibition).
102. The majority of professional German negotiators favor legal consequences (in this specific case,
a right of rescission) in only one of nine cases (with 45% in favor of legal consequences in another
study). Among German students, the majority favors legal consequences in two out of nine cases (and
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believed that the law did not cover all forms of lies, 103 and case law reveals that
there are also almost no court rulings for such cases. 104 This could stem from the
fact that, due to their Rechtsgefühl, the deceived parties do not want to enforce their
rights.105
Whether legal rights are enforced influences the behavior of market participants. If they recognize that certain lies do not prompt legal repercussions, they
will not adapt their behavior to the legal rules, rather they will respond to the actual
situation.106 Thus, they will change their behavior according to the possible alternative courses of action like social sanctions and the degree to which they anticipate
deceptions by the opposing party.107 This implies that the illegality of a given behavior will have little influence on market participants’ behavior in the absence of
enforcement. The law declaring lies to be illegal will therefore not effectively reduce the frequency of false statements made in negotiations. Thus, many of the
negative effects caused by lies arise even when the legal system regards all deceptions as unlawful, like the German legal system. To an extent, the lack of legal
enforcement can also damage the reputation of the legal system as a whole, 108
which may result in a loss of the law’s steering effect in other areas as well. To
conclude, if the Rechtsgefühl contributes to a lack of enforcement, the law will not
be able to effectively mitigate the costs of lies.

D.

Interim Results

Overall, the analysis demonstrates a connection between moral, legal, and economic aspects and the frequency of lies. The enforceability of legal rights as well
as alternative courses of action is affected by the frequency of lies as well as moral
beliefs and the Rechtsgefühl. It must also be noted that the very existence of a claim
can affect the available courses of action, such as renegotiation. Interdependencies
also exist between morality and the Rechtsgefühl, and the frequency of lies. While
the interdependence between the Rechtsgefühl and the Judiz is complex, there is a

in another study it is 46.5%). The surveyed judges and attorneys each support a right to rescind the
contract in two cases. Siegen Study, Study on Bluffs in B2B Contract Negotiations, University of Siegen,
questionnaire available at https://www.wiwi.uni-siegen.de/contractgovernance/survey/?lang=de.
103. An additional survey to the Siegen Study also examines the Judiz (sense how the law is). Only in
2 out of 9 cases the German students believe that the law actually grants the deceived party a right to
rescind. This is only the case for lies about the subject matter of the contract and lies about the legal
situation.
104. For example, only one case on a misrepresentation about a better alternative offer could be found.
Amtsgericht Berlin [AG] [District Court], Mar. 22, 1933, 171 C 130/33 (published incompletely
DEUTSCHE JUSTIZ: RECHTSPFLEGE UND RECHTSPOLITIK; AMTL.
BLATT
D. DEUTSCHEN RECHTSPFLEGE, 823Ä24 (1933)).
105. There are further explanations for the lack of jurisprudence concerning certain deceptions. Another
reason is regularly the lack of evidence as well as the reluctance to settle disputes in court, especially in
permanent business relationships. See also infra Section III. C. 1.
106. If this is reflected economically, one could also speak of legal risk management.
107. See also Tietzel, supra note 7, at 30-31 explaining how social sanctions can help to uphold moral
rules.
108. Geiger, VORSTUDIEN ZU EINER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS, 390 (1964) (èDie Sanktionstätigkeit der
Instanz Ï kann dann einfach nicht mit dieser Kriminalitätsfrequenz Schritt halten und verspielt ihr
Ansehen durch Ineffektivität.æ).
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clear distinction between morality and the Rechtsgefühl.109
Rechtsgefühl is endowed with an independent meaning.

V.

271
Thus, the term

ECONOMIC APPROACHES

This section is oriented on the homo economicus110 because B2B contract negotiations are generally characterized by a high degree of rationality. National legislators usually expect rationality from the parties to B2B negotiations. 111 Therefore, rationality can be considered a baseline requirement of B2B negotiations and
the classical economic approaches based on homo economics are applicable.112
The following overview presents the economic approaches that will be used to
analyze the different types of lies. The analysis refers to one-off negotiations, but
significant differences in long-term business relationships are addressed as well.
Some of these economic approaches take an abstract view towards lies indicating
whether lies generally result in negative or positive effects. However, they seemingly do not lead to different results when applied to different types of lies. Where
practicable, insights are provided on an economically expedient formulation of possible legal consequences from these approaches.

A.

Transaction Costs

Given B2B contract negotiations, lies can substantially increase transaction
costs.113 However, a distinction must be drawn between different types of transaction costs. First, some transaction costs are associated with the èinventionæ and
telling of the lie. These costs are borne by the deceiver and include the time and
money spent manipulating documents used in furtherance of the deception, as well
as the time and effort spent on instructing and preparing agents to tell such lies.
Second, there are transaction costs associated with the fear of lies. These costs
are primarily borne by the potentially deceived party. These costs arise from preventive measures such as informing oneself beforehand and investing in good relationships,114 as well as from investigations, such as verifying offered information.
109. The Siegen Study investigates the relationship of morality and the Rechtsgefühl. Siegen Study,
questionnaire available at https://www.wiwi.uni-siegen.de/contractgovernance/survey/?lang=de; see
also Jung, supra note 3, at 983; Stefanie Jung, Das Rechtsgefühl im Vertragsrecht,
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, issue 4, 378, 414,. An additional survey also examines the Judiz. The distinction
between morality and the Rechtsgefühl becomes very clear with regard to bluffs about product availability: 81% of American lawyers consider such a lie to be immoral, but only 14% favor ordering legal
consequences.
110. The èeconomic manæ is characterized by being rational and self-interested and acting in a way to
maximize his or her utility.
111. For example, in Europe, even for the offence of deception in fair trading law, the notion of a
fictitious, economically reasonable average consumer, applies; Cf. Council Directive 2005/29/EC, Recital 18, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 25 (EC) (è[A]verage consumer, who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors.æ).
112. This article will not examine shifts caused by psychological findings or behavioral economics.
These disciplines will only be invoked where the lie aims at such an effect.
113. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-42
(1985); Transaction Costs Economics, HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 135 (Schmalensee
& Willig eds., 1989) (illustrating fundamental principles on transaction costs).
114. Hence, the fear of being lied to with the associated transaction costs might be reduced by a longterm relationship. However, even if the parties have a very good relationship, the fear of some (less
severe) lies might persist. One study found a corresponding relation between the parties’ relationship
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Parties may attempt to mitigate the cost of lies by drafting special contract terms
that address their fear of potential lies.
Third, transaction costs associated with the detection of deception may arise.
Some of these costs may occur only for the deceived party, like the costs of securing
evidence, while other costs arise for both parties. If a lie is exposed, legal costs like
attorney fees may be incurred. Depending on the legal system these costs may have
to be borne by both parties. Costs may also arise with social sanctions, including
the time and effort spent enforcing those sanctions. In the case of a contract rescission, parties will have to renegotiate or more likely negotiate with other partners.
Fourth, transaction costs arise from the time and effort spent on the negotiation
process. Hence, prolonging the negotiation process also increases transaction costs.
However, it is not clear whether lies result in longer or shorter negotiations. Lies
with distributional effects within the ZOPA115 might allow parties to arrive at compromises more easily, and therefore within a shorter time frame. However, the corresponding possible positive economic effects seem relatively small, because the
time gained would probably be marginal compared to the total amount of time spent
on contract negotiations.
Moreover, some of these transaction costs occur not only in the event of actual
deception but also where one party fears being misled.116 Hence, these costs partially depend on the expectation of the potentially deceived party. Therefore, transaction costs may arise even where the deception has not been successful. 117 Thus,
a law regulating only causal deceptions cannot mitigate all possible negative economic effects resulting from lies. For this reason, it is worth considering establishing legal consequences, even for non-causal misleading information. Such rules
could have distinct effects, different from rules regulating causal misrepresentations. They could be designed to compensate for damages and they could serve as
a means of deterrence.118
To conclude, a closer look at the transaction costs confirms that deceptions,
which are causal to the conclusion of a contract and have been uncovered, may
result in particularly high transaction costs. However, many legal systems might
not compensate for all damages of causal lies, such as the costs associated with
developing strong relationships and informing oneself better. 119 In case of rescission, many legal systems would not compensate the deceived party for the lost time
or effort invested in the negotiation, which reduces the incentives for deceived parties to enforce the law.120
and deceptions (the better the relationship the fewer deceptions), although the results were only based
on self-declarations and not on observed behavior. Schweitzer & Croson, supra note 54, at 233. However, other studies based on laboratory experiments have not always shown a clear connection between
fewer deceptions and friendship respectively rapport. See Sandy Jap et al., The Dark Side of Rapport:
Agent Misbehavior Face-to-Face and Online, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1610-1622 (2011); Per van der Wijst &
Emiel Krahmer, Friendship, Deception, and Punishment in Negotiations, Presentation at the 22ND ANN.
INT’L A. CONFLICT MGM’T CONF. (June 15-18, 2009).
115. Lies may influence the distribution of the negotiation pie, meaning that the parties still find an
agreement within the ZOPA, but one party may receive a bigger slice of the negotiation pie due to the
lie.
116. Supra note 2.
117. When this may be the case see 2 and 3. Cf. GERRIT HÖLZLE, VERSTRICKUNG DURCH
DESINFORMATION, 11 (2012) (on information and search costs).
118. Levmore, supra note 18, at 1364–66 (describing deterrent nature of rules on deception).
119. Supra note 2.
120. Supra note 3.
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Cheapest-cost Avoider

Where a party intentionally lies, the liar is the cheapest-cost avoider regarding
the dissemination of the truth, because he or she knows the real facts. Cheapestcost avoider refers to a concept where the party that can best minimize costs bears
the economic risk.121 By simply telling the truth or remaining silent, the liar can
easily avoid the error of the deceived party. This argument applies even if the deceived party were able to detect the deception at a low cost. 122 Therefore, the concept of the cheapest-cost avoider appears pertinent for a possible legal design. The
basic idea of èintent beats negligenceæ could be applied in the context of deceptions,123 meaning that the law should grant deceived parties the right to rescind contracts or claim damages even if they were negligent. Another entirely different issue
is whether the liar is also the cheapest-cost avoider regarding gathering information,124 although it is not addressed here.

C.

Welfare Economics in the Sense of Allocation Efficiency

Regarding allocation efficiency, correct information is essential for markets.
In general, competitive markets serve to distribute goods and services in such a way
as to achieve an efficient welfare outcome.125 To realize a high level of allocation
efficiency, markets require the best available information in the fastest time possible
so that they can process the information and react to it.126 Lies perpetuate the circulation of false information. As a result, market participants receive incorrect information and in turn make suboptimal decisions.
At the individual level, rational negotiators orient their negotiations around
their BATNA when making a decision for or against a specific contract.127 In rational negotiations, the relationship between the BATNAs of the two negotiating
121. It is assumed here, that there would be some costs associated with finding out the truth for the
party being lied to. Under certain circumstances those costs, however, can be very low (e.g. if it is possible to easily find the information online or get reliable information by asking someone).
122. Posner, supra note 7, at 122.
123. Section 123 of the German Civil Code (BGB) applies the concept of èintent beats negligenceæ.
Cf., e.g., Andreas Feuerborn, in 1 NOMOS KOMMENTAR BGB, 2021, Vol. 1, § 123 no. 38; Armbrüster,
supra note 91, at § 123 no. 23. In contrast, the U.S. concept of èmisrepresentationæ requires èjustified
relianceæ. Circumstances in which a justified reliance is rejected include, for example, lies of minor
importance to the contract or false statements that are not expected to be taken seriously. Obvious misrepresentations should regularly not be trusted either. In this respect, the common business practices also
play a role. Hence, the deceived party is responsible to a certain extent. The deceived party is assigned
personal responsibility; s/he cannot therefore rely on every statement. The principle of èintent beats
negligenceæ known in German law therefore does not apply fully in the U.S. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts p. 447 (Am. Law Inst. 1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §
4.14 (2004); Fleming James Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation æ Part II, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 488
(1978); Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 16, at 411. For obvious misrepresentations, see Estate of
McKenney, 953 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 571 (Pa., 2002)
(èWhether reliance on an alleged misrepresentation is justified depends on whether the recipient knew
or should have known that the information supplied was falseæ) (citing Scaife Co. v. Rockwell-Standard
Corp., 446 Pa. 280, 285 A.2d 451 (1971) (citing Emery v. Third National Bank, 308 Pa. 308 Pa. 504,
162 A. 281 (1932)).
124. With regard to information obligations (which are not discussed in this paper), such costs must
also be taken into account. See Kronman, supra note 29, at 16.
125. MICHAEL L. MARLOW, PUBLIC FINANCE, 61 (1995).
126. Kronman, supra note 29, at 11-12; Levmore, supra note 7, at 135.
127. Cf. Fisher & Ury, supra note 25, at 102, 112; Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 41.
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partners is determinative as to whether there is a ZOPA for the specific negotiation.128 If the parties’ BATNAs do not overlap, there is no ZOPA. For such situations, the term NOPA is used, which stands for èno possible agreement.æ 129 In the
case of a NOPA, the parties should not conclude the negotiated agreement.130 However, where both parties’ BATNAs do overlap, there is a ZOPA and the parties
should conclude the negotiated agreement. The ZOPA presents the possible rational agreement zone within which there is no preferable alternative to conclude
the contract for either party. In other words, any conclusion of a contract within the
ZOPA is economically reasonable for both parties concerning their BATNA (see
figure 1).131
The following example will help illustrate the situation, it involves the purchase
of a machine on a contract negotiated between A and B:
The best alternative of the potential buyer A is to buy the same machine
for the same conditions from another seller C for $10,000, A’s BATNA.
Hence, he or she will only agree with seller B on a price below $10,000.
Seller B, in turn, has an offer with the same terms from another potential
buyer D for $8,000, B’s BATNA. Consequently, B will only enter into the
contract with A, if A offers more than $8,000. Therefore, there is a ZOPA
between $8,000 and $10,000.132

Fig. 1: BATNA and ZOPA.
Deceptions can affect BATNA and ZOPA/NOPA in different ways, or have no
effect at all. Where a ZOPA is given, deceptions that do not affect the BATNA and
the ZOPA usually have a distributional effect within the ZOPA. 133 In these cases,
the deception aims at a more favorable distribution of the negotiation value for the
128. Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 171.
129. Michael A.Wheeler, First, Let’s Kill All the Agents!, NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS:
ADVICE TO LAWYERS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, SPORTS AGENTS, DIPLOMATS, POLITICIANS, AND
EVERYBODY ELSE 235, 245 (Robert H. Mnookin et al. eds., 1999); Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 171.
130. Due to transaction costs produced by the negotiation process, the parties are usually advised to
stop negotiating in case of a NOPA. Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 11.
131. Michael A. Wheeler, Negotiation Analysis: An Introduction, HBS NOTE # 9-801-156, 1, 3 (2000)
(èAny price between those two figures obviously leaves both parties better off than they would be if they
fail to make a deal.æ).
132. The example describes a situation where the only variable is the price. That makes the BATNA
unidimensional. However, in real business-to-business transactions, all circumstances (e.g. quality, date
of delivery, warranty rights) have to be compared and considered with regard to investigating one’s own
BATNA.
133. If there is no ZOPA (i.e. if there is a NOPA), presuming rational negotiations, such deceptions
have no influence on the negotiation outcome.
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deceiver’s side. Yet, a contract is concluded that remains economically sensible for
both parties. Other deceptions can be aimed at the lying party’s or the other party’s
BATNA. The lies about one’s own or the other party’s BATNA, can in turn cause
a variety of false assumptions concerning the ZOPA/NOPA. For example, bluffs
can mislead the parties into assuming that the ZOPA is smaller or larger than it truly
is. Such lies can induce the negotiating parties to assume that, contrary to the actual
circumstances, there is no ZOPA. It is also possible that certain lies deter deceived
parties from further investing in the development of their BATNAs.
The explanations of BATNA and ZOPA may indicate potentially economically
sensible legal consequences. Deceptions that lead to an agreement outside the
ZOPA or an agreement in the absence of the ZOPA create situations in which one
contracting party had a better alternative to the concluded contract. This result leads
to welfare economic losses, meaning that the lie creates suboptimal economic results. In these instances, the lawmaker could envision granting not only a right to
claim contractual damages but also a rescission right.134
If lies only influence the distribution of the negotiation pie, 135 meaning that
they do not lead to an agreement outside the ZOPA, the contract is still economically sensible for both parties despite the lie. Then it remains the task of the legislature to resolve the question of whether the law should interfere with the transfer
of wealth to the deceiver. In the case where lawmakers want to act, they could grant
the deceived party a right to claim damages for the loss suffered. 136 Moreover, the
lawmaker will have to decide whether the deceived party will also be allowed to
rescind the contract even though the contract is economically sensible for both parties. While it does not seem to make economic sense to void an economically sensible contract, secondary effects, such as the deterrence effect of legal consequences, must be considered.
Naturally, the question arises whether a law should differentiate according to
the actual effect137 or according to the potential effects of certain types of lies. 138
Here, the latter solution is promoted, because the focus on potential effects would
significantly increase the legal certainty, which is an essential prerequisite for effective enforcement.139

D.

Truth Signal and Trust

Lies can reduce the truth signal of the liar and also of other market participants.140 In other words, other parties will believe the statements of the liar, and
134. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 321 (2004) (describing
the non-enforcement of contracts in the event of welfare losses).
135. The term ènegotiation pieæ describes the total value of the negotiation. Jung & Krebs, supra note
13, at 125.
136. To the author’s knowledge, no legal system explicitly distinguishes according to the effects of
misrepresentations on the BATNA and ZOPA. However, some legal systems might leave enough scope
for interpretation to decide cases in this manner. U.S. law, for instance, leaves room for interpreting in
broad concepts like èmateriality.æ See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS §
9.24 (6th ed. 2009) (èSeemingly erratic approaches toward the issue[] of materiality . . . often mask appellate judges’ covert imposition of control over the findings of fact in the court below.æ).
137. I.e. if the lie led in the specific case to an agreement outside the ZOPA.
138. For example, lies about the subject matter of the contract can potentially, though may not necessarily, lead to an agreement outside the ZOPA.
139. On enforcement and its interdependencies with other factors see infra Section IV. C.
140. See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 8, at 631-33.
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other market participants, less and less. The decline of trust 141 in other market participants means that the lie leads to negative externalities. The loss of trust can
increase transaction costs by increasing the need for the liar and other market participants to expend resources to build trust. The lack of trust also induces the potentially deceived party to invest in attaining the relevant information on his or her
own or verifying the given information.142 These negative effects also occur if the
bluff is discovered during the negotiation. Moreover, by increasing transaction
costs, lack of trust can lead to economically sensible contracts not being entered
into. Hence, the question arises whether the legal system should determine possible
legal consequences of deception even if that misleading information does not affect
if or how the contract is concluded.
A variety of options are theoretically available to redress deception. For example, compensating the deceived party as well as market participants for losses
caused by truth signal dilution. However, the compensation of other market participants does not seem to be feasible in practice, because the losses would be scattered
and spread unevenly among market participants. Another possibility would be establishing a regulation with a sanctioning device, as a means of deterrence.143 However, such legal consequences may not be necessary if the loss of trust and the dilution of the truth signal is limited or nonexistent, depending on the deceived party’s
perception of the lie regarding morality and their Rechtsgefühl. The aforementioned
Siegen Study sheds light on this particular issue and demonstrates that the deceived
party’s perception of the lie varies according to the different types of lies. Moreover, it can be hypothesized that the dilution of the truth signal is generally limited
to the èpeersæ of the deceiver. Where the selling party utters a lie, the truth signal
of other sellers might be weakened, but the truth signal of other buyers is not necessarily weakened.

E.

Spillover Effect

Closely linked to the dilution of the truth signal is the spillover effect. 144 The
spillover effect refers to a situation where the lie of one negotiator induces other
negotiators to also lie.145 If the subsequent lies also cause negative economic effects
and create additional spillover effects, the negative effects can multiply. If, for example, a service provider lies, the deceived buyer may deceive as well, if he or she
finds out about the lie or suspects deception. Hence, in the context of a business
relationship, a lie can increase the probability of a ècounter lieæ which would result
in increased transaction costs.
Even though not immediately covered by the definition of spillover effect, the
circumstance that the deceiver will lie more if his or her lie was effective has to be
taken into account as well. It is possible that the deceiver might initially bluff about
one aspect and, if successful, also start lying about other aspects as well. This might
occur due to the perceived cost-benefit ratio, and the effect might be increased by
141. See GERRIT HÖLZLE, VERSTRICKUNG DURCH DESINFORMATION 73-142 (2012), for an overview
on the economics of trust.
142. Id. at 77 (mentioning information costs and costs for verification); see also Levmore, supra note
8, at 138.
143. On the deterrent nature of rules with regard to deception, see Levmore, supra note 18, at 1364-66.
144. See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 663 (explaining the difference between the two concepts).
145. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 31; Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 663.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2021/iss2/6

22

Jung: Acceptable Lies in Contract Negotiations

No. 2]

Acceptable Lies in Contract Negotiations

277

the fact that lying becomes normalized. Accordingly, regular lies about one aspect
might shift the moral assessment of lies in the direction of lower moral standards.
Spillover effects may also impact other market participants, creating additional
negative externalities.146 Hence, if individual market participants are lying, this can
result in bluffing by others if they realize other liars have gotten away without penalty.147 Consider the following scenario: If the provider of a service successfully
deceives a client and other providers uncover this, they might be more inclined to
deceive their clients as well. This owes to the more favorable cost-benefit ratio of
lies, which increases the appeal of deception.148
As with transaction costs, the dilution of the truth signal, and the loss of trust,
spillover effects might occur in cases where deceptions are necessary for the conclusion of the contract as well as in cases of unsuccessful deceptions. 149 The legal
system could also consider legal consequences in such cases. However, the spillover effect should be diminished in those cases, as unsuccessful bluffs should not
affect the cost-benefit ratio of participants. Still, there might be a spillover effect
because other market participants might believe that they are better liars. It also has
to be noted that market participants who are negatively affected by lies, because of
the spillover effect, are not compensated, as the law does not allow them to claim
damages from the deceiver. As with the loss of trust, compensating other market
participants may not be feasible because their losses will be widely dispersed. Finally, it would be nearly impossible to prove damages caused by a competitor.

F.

Lies Protecting the Right to Remain Silent

Lies are commonly discussed in the context of protecting the right to remain
silent.150 In this discussion, the right to lie appears as the consequence of the absence of an information obligation, or as an effective measure to ensure the implementation of the right to remain silent. The underlying idea is that there is information that a negotiator is not obliged to disclose. Thus, the negotiator can protect
this information and use it to his or her advantage. It is argued that this protection
cannot be achieved by a right to remain silent alone, particularly in the case of skillful questioning by the other party.151 This is because silence or a refusal to reply
often hints at what the refused answer would be.152

146. See generally Francesca Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The
Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 393 (2009) (overviewing the externalities of
unethical behavior).
147. See Tietzel, supra note 7, at 31-32.
148. Cf. John P. Hill & Roy A. Kochendorfer, Knowledge of Peer Success and Risk of Detection as
Determinants of Cheating, 1 DEVEL. PSYCH. 231 (1969) (describing the effect of the knowledge of peer
performance on cheating).
149. This comprises deceptions that are discovered before the conclusion of the contract.
150. Cf. Kronman, supra note 29, at 30. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 357 (6th ed. 2016); Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale,
25 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1994); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 334
(2004).
151. See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 627–28. Levmore, supra note 7, at 137 (èSilence, however,
will protect the buyer only until the seller learns to ask questions that require the buyer either to reveal
the information in question or to be affirmatively dishonestæ).
152. See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 8, at 627-29; see also NYBERG, supra note 11, at 179 (elaborating
that a question can be intrusive and that a lie might be necessary to defend one’s privacy).
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In literature, this problem is discussed primarily regarding oil deposits located
under a property. This means that the discussion addresses value-increasing information. In this specific situation, there is an asymmetry of information, as the buyer
has more information than the seller about the property. If the seller asks the potential buyer whether he or she is aware of any reason why the property is more
valuable than what the potential buyer offers for it,153 the seller would usually become suspicious if the potential buyer refused to make an explicit statement. The
seller might conclude that the potential buyer has grounds to believe that the value
of the property is higher.154 This problem grows more acute the more information
is requested. While it is possible to evade broadly phrased questions without arousing the suspicion of the counterparty, it is virtually impossible with precisely
phrased questions. That is why the pressure to lie arises to protect the information.
According to this approach, a lie is only justified if it is provoked. Unprovoked
deceptions are not initially justified by this line of argumentation. Therefore, legislatures could consider differentiating between èprovokedæ and èunprovokedæ
lies.155 However, this differentiation is difficult due to the legal uncertainty because, in some circumstances, a conclusion may also be drawn from the silence of
the counterparty, even without prior requests of information.156 Finally, there is the
risk that negotiation strategies that actively try to circumvent this differentiation
between provoked and unprovoked lies will emerge.157 That is why such a regulatory approach should be rejected.
Further, even if there is a right to remain silent, not all information can be obtained in all situations and despite the help of good questioning skills, information
may remain unavailable.158 If the negotiator refuses to answer the question of
whether oil deposits are located under the property in question, the provider can
merely deduce that the questioned party probably has some information about a
possible oil deposit. However, the seller can neither predict how likely an oil deposit is, how much recoverable oil there may be, nor how extensive the production
will be. In that case, asking further questions does not contribute to retrieving this
specific information if the other party resolutely refuses to answer. Thus, questions
can only provide partial information on more complex aspects. Regarding the incentive structure, a right to lie provides stronger incentives to obtain certain information, while a right to remain silent alone does not necessarily eliminate incentives
to generate certain information. This can be affirmed by the previously

153. See Levmore, supra note 8, at 139 (formulating the following question).
154. Cf. Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 628; Levmore, supra note 7, at 137. But see Michael J. Borden,
Mistake and Disclosure in a Model of Two-Sided Informational Inputs, 73 MO. L. REV. 667 (2008)
(pleading instead for a èminimal truthful disclosure ruleæ).
155. To the knowledge of the author, no legal system actually does explicitly differentiate between
èunprovokedæ and èinducedæ lies.
156. Example: If a supplier demands an excessive price and the potential buyer protests, but without
indicating that there are other suppliers offering it at a lower price, the supplier could conclude that the
buyer is not aware of these options and therefore does not know his/her BATNA well. Therefore, if the
buyer wants to protect the information that s/he is not well informed about his/her BATNA, s/he could
bluff and simply claim that other suppliers have better offers.
157. Such as confirmation that all information given was disclosed at the request and on demand of the
other party.
158. Borden, supra note 154, at 689-91 (describing possible reactions of the provider (two-sided model)
and especially situations where the provider does not acquire the full information. In this respect, the
author differentiates between èdeepæ and èshallowæ secrets).
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substantiated argument that questioning usually only leads to the acquisition of partial information.
In sum, this suggests that even upon disclosure of partial information, the request for information causes a shift in assets, while lying may prevent that. The
ability to request information allows the questioner to generate a kind of èwindfall
profitæ because the questioner can obtain at least part of the information and thereby
secure an advantage with skillful questioning.159 Hence, the lawmaker has to decide
whether to prevent the aforementioned shifts of assets through questioning. A right
to lie could effectively prevent this transfer of assets, so long as no differentiation
into types of lies is required. However, the possibility of lying may create other
negative economic consequences. This includes increased transaction costs, a diluted truth signal, and loss of trust. Moreover, the emergence of spillover effects
cannot be excluded. Last but not least, in line with the above-presented arguments,
the lawmaker would have to allow not only for èprovokedæ lies but also for èunprovokedæ ones.

G.

Lies That Cause a Pareto-Improvement

If a misrepresentation puts both parties in a better position, or at least one party
is in a better position and the other party is not in a worse position, the lie is Paretoimproving.160 The latter is often called a èpaternalisticæ lie 161 or èPareto white
lie.æ162 However, the scope of paternalistic lies or Pareto white lies in B2B negotiations is much narrower than in other areas. This is because deceptions in negotiations are generally aimed at improving the liar’s situation at the expense of the other
party. If a win-win is possible, in most cases there is no need to use deceptive
tactics. In this context, the hypothetical bargain theory and the theory of èimplied
consentæ can be invoked. These theories argue that in some instances, the deceived
party would have consented to the lie ex ante.163 It should not matter if the party
accepts the lie ex post, because the hypothetical consent ex ante already signals that
the lie results in a welfare gain and is, at least ex ante, deemed Pareto efficient.164
Implied consent might be assumed in cases where, ex ante, the party to be deceived
stands a chance to profit from the lie.165 The typical example is a restaurant critic
who dines in a restaurant to write a review.166 The critic might lie about his or her
identity and the purpose of the restaurant visit to stay anonymous. However, most
restaurants would agree to an undercover visit ex ante, because they hope to win
159. Levmore, supra note 7, at 142 (comparing the situation to expropriation).
160. The concept is named after Vilfredo Pareto. See ROBERT HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN,
MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS, 442-43 (2008) (introduction to Pareto improvements); see also Vijay K. Mathur, How Well Do We Know Pareto Optimality?, 22 J. ECON. EDUC., 172
(1991).
161. See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 7, at 656-61 (detailing this form of lying and its economic effects);
Bok, supra note 12, at 203-19 (on this form of lies).
162. Sanjiv Erat & Uri Gneezy, White Lies, 58 MGMT. SCI. 723, 724 (2012) (using the term and exploring how often participants use pareto white lies).
163. Levmore, supra note 18, at 1366; see also Jules L. Coleman, A Bargaining Theory Approach to
Default and Disclosure Provisions in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 639, 648 (1989) (explaining, with regard to default rules, that the issue is not so much whether the parties actually agreed on
this outcome, but rationality).
164. Levmore, supra note 18, at 1366.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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from a positive review.167 In B2B contract negotiations implied consent will be the
exception rather than the rule, because there is rarely a chance that the deceived
party might profit from the misrepresentation.
Deceptive negotiation tactics can also form a kind of business practice. 168 It
could be argued that the parties have implicitly, ex-ante agreed on certain èrules of
the game.æ Consent to the èrules of the gameæ could be assumed, because both
parties are allowed to use certain bluffs and therewith mutually benefit. It is argued
that over time groups develop such business practices that are most successful for
the parties involved.169 Hence, if it can be proven that certain deceptions are inherent in business practice, this could indicate that the behavior is efficient for the participants. Although a business practice cannot prove that this behavior is efficient,
it can serve as an indication.

H.

Structural Favoring of the Weaker Party and Diversity

It has to be assessed if structurally weaker parties are more likely to deceive
and profit more from lying than stronger parties. If this could be confirmed, the
lawfulness of certain deceptions could compensate for structural imbalances in negotiations. It follows that weaker players could remain in the market if permitted
to deceive. This could contribute to a lower concentration of power and allow the
market as a whole to be both more flexible and adaptive. The importance of adaptability is evident in crisis situations because a high degree of adaptability helps to
overcome difficult situations. The latter hypothesis is supported by the theory of
evolution that assumes that deceptions both intra-species170 and inter-species can
serve to preserve the species,171 as deceptions enable a wider range of variation.
This has a positive effect on the species, particularly in evolutionary crises, because
intelligence172 and adaptability become more valuable than mere strength under
those circumstances.173 This cannot justify all lies but may support a certain scope
167. Id.
168. See Act Against Unfair Competition, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_uwg/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2021) (with regard to the 2008 amendment to the German Act Against
Unfair Competition, the parliament draft stated that the term geschäftliche Praxis [business practice/practices] is negatively connotated in Germany); but see Bundestagsdrucksache 16/10145 (2008) at
20, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/101/1610145.pdf (example of geschäftliche Praxis used neutrally).
169. Richard A. Epstein, Customary Practices and the Law of Torts, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
ECON. & L., 579 (Newman ed.) (1998).
170. Alison Jolly, Primate Communication, Lies, and Ideas, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN SYMBOLIC
EVOLUTION 167, 172 (Lock & Peters eds., 1996); Richard Byrne & Andrew Whiten, Cognitive Evolution
in Primates: Evidence from Tactical Deception, 27 MAN, NEW SERIES 609 (1992) (both on intra species
deception); see generally MARTIN STEVENS, CHEATS AND DECEITS (2016) (discussing how animals and
plants mislead).
171. WILLIAM A. SEARCY & STEPHEN NOWICKI, THE EVOLUTION OF ANIMAL COMMUNICATION:
RELIABILITY AND DECEPTION IN SIGNALING SYSTEMS 219-223 (2005) (èäindividual selection, rather
than group selection, has been increasingly accepted as the primary engine of adaptation, making cooperation appear less likely, and intraspecific deception conversely seem more probable . . .’ Thus, we
believe that it is realistic to expect deception to be widespread in animal signaling systems.’æ).
172. Victoria Talwar & Angela Crossman, From Little White Lies to Filthy Liars: The Evolution of
Honesty and Deception in Young Children, 40 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEV. & BEHAV. 139, 144 (2011)
(èThe development of deception may be viewed as a cognitive milestone in any species.æ).
173. VOLKER SOMMER, LOB DER LÜGE 11 (2016) (explaining that intelligence has increased in the
course of evolution precisely because humans have attempted to expose liars, while simultaneously trying to lie better to others themselves).
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for deception. The argument provides no direct clues for how to determine that
scope, which is why this argumentation cannot be transferred directly to the presented types of lies. On the one hand, it could be argued that false statements by
the weaker party about aspects that do not immediately concern the subject matter
of the contract and lead to an agreement within the ZOPA should be considered
legal because they merely have distributional effects. On the other hand, a legal
rule that leaves the weaker party with a certain scope of deception would result in
high legal uncertainty. As this would lower the actual enforcement, this idea should
be rejected.174 Hence, the possibility for deception would have to be granted in
general and could then structurally favor the weaker party.

I.

SUMMARY

All of the aforementioned economic approaches and arguments seem to provide valuable insights for the question of a possible legal solution to the problem.
Some of them provide more general insights into the phenomenon of lies in B2B
contract negotiations. In other words, they seemingly do not lead to different results
when applied to different types of lies. This is the case for concepts like the cheapest-cost avoider, the right to lie to protect the right to remain silent, and the structural
favoring of the weaker party. In contrast, others have different consequences when
applied to different types of lies. This is true for transaction costs, welfare economics with special attention on the impact on BATNA and ZOPA, business practices,
truth signal, and trust as well as spillover effects.

VI.

BASELINE SCENARIO AND COMPARISON SCENARIO

In the following section, two comparative scenarios will be outlined. In short,
the baseline scenario represents a situation without legal consequences for lies,
while the comparison scenario refers to a situation where the law orders legal consequences. When applying the economic approaches to the different types of lies,
the potential and real effects may vary, so the èworst case scenarios,æ the scenarios
with the most far-reaching effects, will be examined.

A.

Baseline Scenario

For the economic analysis of the types of lies presented below, the baseline
scenario outlines a situation without legal sanctions for lies. Moreover, it also assumes that parties cannot contractually agree on sanctions and enforce those sanctions in court. The liar does not have to fear that the deceived party will rescind the
contract or claim damages. But even without legal sanctions, people would not lie
all the time and not about everything. As stated above,175 the probability of a person
lying hinges on the cost-benefit ratio.176 The alternative courses of action, including
renegotiations and social sanctions, that are at the disposal of the deceived party in
174. Moreover, there would be many regulatory problems like the correct determination of the relative
strength of the parties.
175. See infra Section IV. B.
176. See Cramton & Dees, supra note 63, at 376 (explaining that people tend to lie for their own benefit).
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the baseline scenario still have to be considered. The risk of disclosure 177 as well
as the moral assessment of a particular lie also plays a role in the baseline scenario.
Regarding the moral assessment, the findings of the Siegen Study are consulted.
Finally, the relational solutions that market participants would seek to minimize the
negative effects of lying are also considered.
In reality, there is no legal system as described in the baseline scenario. But
some liberally oriented legal systems share similar justifications for legal prohibitions. This is the reason why a situation with no prohibition is considered an adequate starting point to examine the reasonableness of legal prohibitions. The alternative to this approach would be to choose the status quo as the baseline scenario. 178
Yet, this would hardly be amenable because of the substantial divergences between
national legal systems.179 Hence, this article adopts èno legal consequencesæ as the
baseline scenario. As this article does not discuss the relationship between legal
rules and contractual arrangements that mirror legal rules, it is also assumed that no
contractual arrangements are possible. If this were not the case, the discussion
would boil down to the question of whether contractual stipulations can be, as effective as, or even more effective than legal rules.

B.

Comparison Scenario

The comparison scenario is the benchmark for the economic implications that
a prohibition of certain deceptions would have in contract negotiations. The right
to rescind the contract and to claim damages for intentional,180 causal misrepresentations, will be considered. Non-causal lies are assumed to not grant the deceived
party any rights. Moreover, it will be assumed that the deceived party has to prove
the relevant facts. Finally, apart from the deceived party, no other market participants are entitled to bring claims.
This approach requires paying special attention to the expected enforcement of
granted legal positions. Assessing the effects of a legal prohibition of lies is essential to ascertain the extent to which it would be implemented in practice. If the
177. See Cramton & Dees, supra note 63, at 373 (explaining the influence of the possibility of detection); see also Maurice E. Schweitzer, Deception in Negotiations, WHARTON ON MAKING DECISIONS
187, 191 (Hoch et al. eds., 2001) (pointing out that the estimation of the probability might be biased).
178. With regard to legislative impact assessments, in general the status quo is adopted as the èbaseline
scenarioæ (no policy change scenario). See, e.g., European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines Impact Assessment, 24-25, (2009), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelinesimpact-assessment.pdf.
179. See Jung, supra note 3, at 992–1001 (articulating the differences between U.S. law and German
law).
180. However, U.S. law also regulates so-called èinnocent misrepresentations.æ Mortarino v. Consultant Eng. Servs., Inc., 467 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Va. 1996). In the case of èinnocent misrepresentation,æ however, rescission is partially rejected if the contract has already been fully executed. JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 293 (7th ed. 2014). See also SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 69:49 (4th ed. 2019); ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28:14 (2018); Farnsworth,
supra note 123, § 4.15 (presenting differing opinion with regard to non-fraudulent misrepresentations).
Section 123 of the German Civil Code only grants a right to rescind in case of a fraudulent (èarglistigæ)
misrepresentation. The term èarglistigæ means èwillfullyæ or èintentionally.æ See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 13, 2007, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW] 3057, 3059 (2007). See also Armbrüster, supra note 91, at § 123 no. 18; Jung, supra note 3, at
988. For damages claims based on culpa in contrahendo (c.i.c.), i.e. negligence in contracting, negligence suffices. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 280, para. 1, § 241, para.
2, § 311, para. 2, § 276.
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prohibition is applied effectively, it will noticeably influence the cost-benefit ratio
of deceptions and reduce the extent of deceptions. For the enforcement of the obligation to tell the truth, Tietzel states the following:
Whatever one does: fraud is unlikely to be completely eradicated, nor
would it be worth the effort; for since cost-benefit considerations also play
a role here, the optimal containment of fraud will always be less than the
maximum possible.181
In this article, a broad definition of enforcement is used, which means that enforcement is not only assumed when a party asserts a claim in front of a court, but
also if claims for damages or rescission are made to the other side directly.182 From
an economic point of view, it is only sensible for a legal system to declare lies unlawful where enforcement is reasonably possible.

VII.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR SELECTED TYPES OF LIES

In the following, the economic consequences of lies about the subject matter of
the contract, the price, emotions, and one’s BATNA are analyzed. For each of these
four types of lies, the economic consequences of the baseline and comparison scenarios will be evaluated. If deception does not yield negative economic consequences, there is no need for regulation in the first place. Where negative effects
are a result, the question arises whether and to what extent, legal regulation can help
overcome such negative consequences. Laws are only economically justified if
they help to mitigate negative consequences. The explanation of the types of lies
illustrates that there are also different variations within a single type of lie. Moreover, the economic analysis could also vary depending on the degree of precision
of the lie.183

A.

Subject Matter of the Contract æ Lies of the Supplier About the
Contract Object

The baseline scenario will demonstrate the negative economic effects of lies by
the supplier concerning the contract object. The comparison scenario will show
that legal rules prohibiting such lies would have substantial positive economic effects. This analysis is limited to lies by the supplier about the contract object, a
buyer lying to the supplier is not considered.

181. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 33 (providing free translation of èWas immer man tut: Betrug wird wohl
weder vollständig auszurotten sein, noch würde sich der Versuch dazu lohnen; denn da auch hier KostenNutzen-Überlegungen eine Rolle spielen, wird die optimale Eindämmung von Betrug stets geringer sein
als die maximal möglicheæ).
182. In practice, however, it is often difficult to distinguish renegotiations (which belong to the baseline
scenario) from the enforcement of damage claims and a right to rescind.
183. With regard to a better offer a negotiator might state, for example, èOther sellers offer a better
priceæ or s/he might state èI have a better offer from another selleræ or s/he might even say èI have a
better offer from seller X for exactly the same goodæ.
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Baseline Scenario

How often suppliers would lie about the subject matter of the contract if there
was no legal prohibition can only be roughly estimated. It depends on the information asymmetry between the supplier and buyer, which depends on the nature of
the subject matter.184 However, in the absence of legal consequences, a substantial
amount of lies can be expected, since the potential advantages of lying can be significant. This is particularly true for one-off negotiations. In contrast, within longterm relationships, the frequency of lies will be lower if there is a substantial risk of
detection.
The fact that such lies are regarded as immoral across all countries and all
groups185 indicates that liars would suffer so-called èlying costsæ that would have
some moral regulatory effect. However, the lying costs could not prevent such deceptions altogether. The same applies to social sanctions, which would have to be
anticipated if the bluff is uncovered. Since such lies are consistently regarded as
immoral, sizeable social sanctions are to be expected.186 Moreover, other possible
courses of action of the deceived party, such as renegotiations have to be considered.
The supplier’s lies about their performance are usually aimed at improving
their position and they accept that the other side is put at a disadvantage due to the
lie, hence the term èharmful lies.æ Therefore, such deceptions are generally not
Pareto-improving. Moreover, considerable transaction costs arise, both for the deceiver and the deceived side, because lies about the characteristics of the contract
object initially require a certain use of resources by the deceiver. It should also be
considered that the contractual object is, oftentimes, possessed by the recipient after
the supplier performs. The fact that the contract object is possessed by the recipient
enables the recipient to verify compliance with the promised performance and the
corresponding details, which were laid out during negotiations. Therefore, the deceiver must devote certain efforts to prevent the lie from being easily exposed.
Characteristics of the contract object that lead to large information asymmetry are
difficult to verify, which makes them particularly suitable for misrepresentation. 187
To be credible, there might be a need to bolster the lie with false documents, which
would increase transaction costs.
The deceived party will dedicate resources to prevent and detect such deception, especially where deception is suspected. This can be explained by the substantial risk for the deceived party that they will conclude a contract outside the
ZOPA. The deceived party’s efforts to prevent and detect deception are welfarereducing. When the lie is exposed, expenses are easily incurred by both parties
because of extrajudicial reactions by the deceived party, such as renegotiations or
applying social sanctions.
Moreover, deceptions about the contractual object generally dilute the truth
signal and entail a loss of trust whenever they are discovered. This applies both to
184. Cf. Tietzel, supra note 7, at 23–26.
185. Supra note 4, at 980.
186. These change the cost-benefit analysis of lies concerning the subject matter of the contract and
result in fewer lies.
187. See Tietzel, supra note 7, at 25 (As an example of high transaction costs associated with the verification of statements the author cites the harmfulness of some foods on health). See also Cramton &
Dees, supra note 63, at 373 (on the higher attractiveness of lies in cases of information asymmetry).
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the truth signal of the liar and the dilution of the truth signal of other negotiators.
The loss of trust is particularly pronounced in the case of deception about the contract object.188 Practical experience also points out that deceptions about the product itself may be exposed outside of the sphere of the companies involved ènaming
and shaming.æ This damages the liar’s reputation, but simultaneously dilutes the
truth signal of other negotiators, especially the peers of the liar. This creates transaction costs for sincere negotiators, as they have to spend resources to prove their
integrity.189 There can also be a spillover effect depending on whether the deception
is publicized.
Additionally, it should be noted that the Siegen Study indicates that deception
about the contractual object is regarded as a severe lie.190 This implies that the
spillover effect, especially in the form of counter-lies, could be exceptionally high.
While the purchaser of an object usually cannot lie about the object, they might feel
èentitledæ to deceive in other, less severe ways. Besides, an increase in deception
among competitors may be observed as they notice successful deceit has occurred.
This economic analysis demonstrates that the lies of the supplier concerning
the contract object invariably result in substantial negative economic effects. This
effect is not diminished significantly by the possibility that the weaker party may
benefit from the lie more than the stronger party.191

2.

Comparison Scenario

A legal system that provides for legal consequences for such deceptions can
anticipate significantly positive economic effects. This occurs because there is at
least the possibility that the supplier’s deceptions about the contractual subject can
be exposed and proven ex post. 192 Due to the pontentially negative consequences
for the deceived party, even legal enforcement can be worthwhile. The Siegen
Study shows that a majority of respondents in all studied countries favor legal consequences and would therefore probably be inclined to enforce such claims in
court.193 The case law of Germany and the U.S. also demonstrates that claims stemming from such violations are regularly enforced.194 Therefore, the law has a
188. Supra note 4, at 980.
189. On the economics of reputation, see JAN C. TEGTMEYER, DIE ÖKONOMIK DER REPUTATION
(2005), https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-uni-passau/frontdoor/index/index/year/2005/docId/51; see also
GERRIT HÖLZLE, VERSTRICKUNG DURCH DESINFORMATION 137–40 (2012).
190. Supra note 4, at 980.
191. See supra Section V.H.
192. As for oral statements, the promised status is hard to prove, while the current status is easier to
prove.
193. The answers refer to the example that used an exaggeration (in case of an invented fact the results
would probably be even higher): German lawyers (90%); Chinese lawyers (83%); U.S. lawyers (71%);
English lawyers (77%); Polish judges (87%); Russian students (80%); Spanish students (85%).
194. For Germany only see the following judgments (listing as provided by: Holger Wendtland,
BECKOK BGB (Beck online commentary on civil law), § 123 no. 9.1 (as of 01.02.2020): concerning the
age of an oriental carpet BGH, Dec. 8, 1976, DER BETRIEB [DB] 671 (1977); concerning the mileage of
a second-hand passenger car BGH, Oct. 29, 1959, NJW 237 (1960); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher
regional court] Köln, Feb. 10, 1988, NJW-RECHTSPRECHUNGSREPORT [NJW-RR] 1136 (1988); concerning untrue labelling such as èready to driveæ BGH, Apr. 21, 1993, NJW 1854 (1993), ègenerally
overhauledæ BGH, Jan. 18, 1995, NJW, 955, 956 (1995), ènewæ or èas good as newæ (Kammergericht
[KG] OLGZ 1972, 402), concerning the advertising of basement rooms as living space, although there
is no corresponding building permit available BGH, June 27, 2014, NJW 3296 (2014). For the U.S. only
see Weng v. Allison, 287 Ill. App. 3d 535 (1977) (concerning untrue descriptions of a car such as
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steering effect that may mitigate but not eliminate some of the negative economic
effects. This is because even a ègoodæ law cannot eliminate the possibility of lying.
Therefore, the deceived party will still be required to prevent and detect lies, despite
the legal provision.
As all legal systems generally require causality, they cannot prevent some of
the negative economic effects associated with lies. Particularly lies which are discovered before the conclusion of a contract and, therefore, do not become causal,
continue to reduce the truth signal, and the trust between the parties and might cause
spillover effects. However, in many cases lies about the contract object are causal
for the conclusion of the contract. Accordingly, the law would at least cover many
cases of lies about the subject matter of the contract. Moreover, it has to be taken
into account that laws regularly compensate the deceived party, while other injured
market participants are not compensated. But the steering effect of the law reduces
the overall number of lies and is in other injured market participants’ best interest.
Overall, this analysis shows that a legal regulation that prohibits lies by the
supplier about the contractual object has substantially positive economic effects.
For this reason, a legal regulation seems sensible from an economic point of view.

B.

Price

The price and the subject matter of the contract are connected: one party undertakes an obligation to provide the other party with ownership of an object or to
render a specific service. In exchange, the other party obligates itself to pay a certain
consideration. While there are countless possibilities to deceive about goods or
services, lies about pricing are limited.
Where the lie deceives about the actual price, this constitutes a deception about
the price in the narrow sense. This includes deceptions in which a price component
is withheld, such as delivery costs and lies about the price calculation mechanism.
If a price calculation mechanism is determined in which the selling price is, for
example, the cost price plus 10%, the seller can be deceived about the actual cost
price. However, deceptions about price in the broad sense are more widespread.
For example, a seller may state a price is a èspecial priceæ or a èmates’ rateæ even
though it is the common price. Especially in business negotiations, deceptions
about production costs, profit margins, and cost prices are also relevant. These can
be seen as price deceptions in the broad sense. This applies if these aspects do not
become the calculation basis for the price, but are merely mentioned as an argument
in the price negotiation. Thus, the differentiation may be difficult in individual
cases.

1.

Price in the Narrow Sense
a.

Baseline Scenario

Deceptions about the price in the narrow sense are only possible to a limited
extent. First, only one party can deceive about the price. The most common deceptions are those related to calculating the price. This is another èharmful lieæ that
èmechanically soundæ); see also Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1984) (èan efficient, highvolume profit produceræ).
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does not result in a Pareto improvement. In negotiations, the price is essential for a
rational decision. That is why lies about the price also incur transaction costs. Although in certain cases the transaction costs for the liar may be low, the party who
fears a lie will invest considerable resources into prevention. Lies about price components in the narrow sense can generally be clarified, since as a rule there are few
information asymmetries, at least after the transaction has been completed. In the
event of successful detection of deception, there would also be transaction costs for
renegotiations and social sanctions.
Such deceptions can also result in an agreement outside ZOPA. Furthermore,
it seems plausible that the liar’s truth signal would be weakened significantly, as
such lies may be deemed immoral.195 A dilution of the truth signal of other market
participants is also plausible. Certain spillover effects in the form of counter-lies are
also to be expected. In these cases, the economic assessment is therefore just as
unambiguous as it is regarding the subject matter of the contract.

b.

Comparison Scenario

Not only can such deceptions be uncovered, but it also seems plausible that
corresponding rights would at least occasionally be enforced. The assumption that
enforcement would occur is also supported by U.S. case law. 196 This is consistent
with the results of an additional survey undertaken in the Siegen Study, in which a
majority of German students and a significant minority of international professional
negotiators also advocate legal consequences.197 A legal rule that makes such lies
illegal would likely result in a substantial positive economic effect. For this reason,
a legal regulation seems sensible from an economic point of view.

2.

Price in the Broad Sense
a.

Baseline Scenario

Regarding lies about the price in the broad sense, one cannot simply refer to
the explanations given about the subject of the contract. If a price is falsely termed
a special price or a friendship price, the potential buyer is still aware of the true
price they have to pay for the product. This is not a lie that qualifies as Paretoimproving, because it has the psychological impact of encouraging the potential
buyer to purchase.198
This deception does not directly influence the BATNA and ZOPA. Thus, the
lie does not induce an agreement outside the ZOPA if rational behavior is practiced.
195. At least this is indicated by the first results of an additional survey to the Siegen Study, in which
a majority of German students (70.4%) a lie about a price calculation mechanism as immoral. Instead an
international group of professional negotiators was divided. 45% rated the lie as immoral, 40% as moral
and 15% refused to answer.
196. See Voorhees v. Cragan, 112 N.E. 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1916); Stewart v. Salisbury Realty & Ins.
Co., 74 S.E. 736 (N.C. 1912); Essenburg v. Russell 78 N.W.2d 136 (Mich. 1956); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
197. In the additional survey to the Siegen Study, 61.1% of German students and 40% of international
professional negotiators were in favor of legal consequences.
198. Angela Hoffmann & Kerstin Hackelbusch, Sonderangebote und psychologische Preissetzung im
deutschen Lebensmitteleinzelhandel, 62 GJAE 173, 175 (2013).
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This applies regardless of whether the offer is a ènormalæ price or a èspecial offeræ
or a èfriendship price.æ In theory, the term èspecial offeræ should not affect the
search for better alternatives. In practice, however, the presentation of a special
price may entice some negotiators to invest less effort in exploring their BATNA.
Especially for goods where the price margins are thin, the labeling as a special price
may induce potential customers to stop seeking better offers.
Psychological effects can cause a shift in the distribution of the surplus because
special prices give buyers the impression that they have made a particularly good
deal. Special prices activate the reward system in the human brain, 199 increasing
the likelihood of purchase. In addition, using a special price is also intended to
provide secondary information that suggests some concession has already been
made and no further concession can be expected thereby resulting in a shift within
the ZOPA.
The transaction costs that result from such lies are negligible. The wrong labeling of the price does not require much effort. The opposing party for its part,
will not invest much effort in the prevention and detection of such lies. Professional
negotiators will avoid the well-known psychological effects. Since these occur regardless of whether the price is a special price or whether a lie has been made about
it, professional negotiators will have to take up these expenses anyway. In this
respect, the transaction costs do not increase due to the lie. If such a lie is detected,
the deceived party may resort to social sanctions and renegotiations, which would
incur the corresponding transaction costs. This is hinted at by the Siegen study,
which shows that at least German students classified these lies as problematic from
a moral point of view.200 In B2B relations, however, it can be anticipated that fewer
professionals would classify such lies as problematic.201 Yet, even then, renegotiations are probable, as the disclosure of the lie will in many cases raise the hope of
still being able to influence the distribution to one’s advantage.
As previously discussed, especially in the business sector it can be assumed
that the wrong labeling as a èfriendship priceæ or èspecial priceæ is probably considered as a rather harmless lie.202 If one follows this assumption, such bluffs will
also often not be made public, which is why the truth signal in the market as a whole
will probably only decrease marginally. Since only one party can deceive about the
price, no direct spillover effect can occur. It is impossible to accurately estimate
whether the person who is being lied to would subsequently be lying about other
aspects. However, it can be assumed that only a limited spillover effect would be
noticed. As a result, only marginally negative economic effects can be identified.
This corresponds to a reduced need for legal regulation.

199. Christian Elger, Mit Neuroökonomie aus der Krise, in GLANZLICHTER DER WISSENSCHAFT 46–47
(2014); Bernd Weber & Carolin Neuhaus, Preise im Kopf: Vom Teuro zur Schnäppchenjagd, in
NEUROMARKETING: ERKENNTNISSE DER HIRNFORSCHUNG FÜR MARKENFÜHRUNG, WERBUNG UND
VERKAUF 35–46 (Häusel ed.) (2007) (on the psychological explanation of discount hunting).
200. In the additional survey to the Siegen Study, 50.7% of German students viewed such lies as immoral.
201. The Siegen Study shows that moral standards of professional negotiators are generally lower than
the moral standards of students. First results of the additional survey confirm this hypothesis, as only
35% of the international professional negotiators view such lies as immoral.
202. Infra note 195.
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b. Comparison Scenario
If a legal system, despite only slight economic disadvantages, decides to classify such deceptions about the price in a broad sense as unlawful, the question arises
as to whether the corresponding regulation could further reduce the already marginal negative effects. It is important to keep in mind that the corresponding deceptions are not always easily detectable and verifiable, but at least there is a theoretical
chance. Therefore, if a legal system grants legal positions, these could potentially
also be enforced. A glance at German case law reveals that enforcement is possible,
as cases of this kind can be found sporadically.203 However, in the United States,
there is no case law regarding such deceptions in the business area. 204 The Siegen
Study showed that the Rechtsgefühl of German students disfavors granting a right
to rescind.205 Thus, for professional negotiators, at least equally low support for a
right to rescind can be expected,206 which suggests that corresponding law would
rarely be enforced. Depending on the structure of the laws, difficulties in enforcement could also arise concerning the causality requirement, since the effect of such
lies is at least partially attributable to psychological effects and cannot be explained
with purely rational arguments.
Moreover, despite the deception, contracts are concluded within the ZOPA,
which is why, if one favors legal consequences at all, damage claims seem to be
particularly suitable for the deceived party. If a legal system were to grant a rescission, this could invalidate economically sensible contracts. To conclude, the negative effects of such deceptions are already limited to start with and legal rules would
struggle to effectively mitigate those effects.

C.

Emotions

Business negotiations bring the most diverse emotions to light. These emotions
can be faked, as to their existence, non-existence, or the intensity of the particular
emotion. In negotiations, parties regularly simulate anger, outrage, joy, enthusiasm,
or appreciation.207 Similarly, it is not unusual for a negotiator to lie about the emotions of their superior.

1.

Baseline Scenario

According to the baseline scenario, the frequency of deceptions about emotions
cannot be determined. However, it appears that such deceptions occur frequently,
as the risk of disclosure is minimal and at least some positive results can be
203. Amtsgericht Düsseldorf [AG] [Düsseldorf District Court], Sep. 10, 2008, 32 C 6293/08, BeckRS
5960, 2009. Similarly, OLG Hamm, June 12, 1992, NJW-RR 628 (1993). OLG Jena, Dec. 6, 2005,
BECK-RECHTSPRECHUNG [BeckRS] 18097 (2011) on the other hand, denied the causality in a case concerning the calculation of the rent. See also OLG Frankfurt, May 12, 1982, DEUTSCHES AUTORECHT
294, 294-95 (1982).
204. Jung, supra note 3, at 986.
205. According to the first results of the additional Siegen Study, only 17.7% of German students favor
legal consequences (regarding a lie about a èfriendship priceæ).
206. According to the first results of the additional Siegen Study, only 20% of the international group
of professional negotiators were in favor of legal consequences.
207. See e.g., ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU
NEGOTIATE et passim. (2005) (discussing the importance of emotions in contract negotiations).
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expected. Faked anger and frustration about the offer may induce the deceived
party to make more concessions. Further, a tough fight about the final offer combined with corresponding emotions is often supposed to signal to the other person
that they got the best deal possible. If the negotiator shows their joy, the other side
is generally less content with the negotiation outcome.208 However, it can further
be assumed that positive emotions are faked even more regularly than negative
ones. This is due to the possible reluctance towards faking negative emotions like
anger. Faking positive emotions also seems to be widely accepted.209 Moreover, a
broad spectrum of negotiation literature suggests that a good rapport with the other
side is crucial for negotiation success. 210 Thus, negotiators might find it useful to
fake positive emotions.
The special feature of this category of deceptions is that some of them can be
classified as èwhite lies.æ211 White lies should provide an advantage to the person
who has been lied to or at least should not cause any harm to that person.212 If white
lies simultaneously provide an advantage for the liar or at least do not cause any
harm to their side, this leads to a Pareto improvement. In addition, white lies serve
as a èsocial lubricant.æ213 During negotiations, joy about an invitation to a business
dinner or a gift by the counterparty may be faked, and the pretense of joy serves to
avoid offending the other side and building and maintaining a good rapport with the
negotiating partner.214 This shows that these positive effects generally occur with
lies about positive emotions. Similar effects can also be established regarding the
suppression of negative emotions. In both cases, the aim is to alleviate the negotiation process.215 In contrast, faking negative emotions does not produce the same
positive effects. Many negotiators make concessions on the subject matter of the
contract, like price or delivery time, to appease a seemingly angry negotiating partner and rescue the business relationship.216 The possible effects of emotions on
contractual agreements demonstrate that many deceptions about emotions can become causal for the contract conclusion.
In contrast to deceptions about the contract object, the transaction costs incurred by corresponding bluffs are presumably very low, irrespective of whether
the negotiator bluffs about positive or negative emotions. Even if the other side
anticipates such a deception, it will hardly invest any resources into the prevention
208. Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 108.
209. Ingrid Smithey Fulmer et al., Lying and Smiling: Informational and Emotional Deception in Negotiation, 88 J. BUS. ETH. 691 (2009). The study shows that bluffs about emotions generally are considered less serious than deceptions about information The additional survey to the Siegen Study also points
in this direction (bluff about a negative emotion). Only a minority of the German students surveyed
considered such a lie to be immoral, and even fewer students favored legal consequences.
210. See, e.g., Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 86.
211. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 12, at 57-72 (on white lies). On the overlap between the two categories,
see Section III.
212. See, e.g., however, Bok, supra note 12, at 58 (using the term èwhite liesæ to refer only to trivial
lies).
213. See Bok, supra note 12, at 59 (è[White lies] preserve the equilibrium and often the humaneness
of social relationships . . .æ). See also Talwar & Crossman, supra note 172, at 150 (on prosocial lies).
214. See Jung & Krebs, DIE VERTRAGSVERHANDLUNG, supra note 13, at 365 (discussing rapport-building).
215. Faking positive emotions serves to create a pleasant atmosphere for the negotiations and in this
way such lies become (co-)causal.
216. See Fisher & Ury, supra note 25, at 8-10 (èseparate the people from the problemæ). The Harvard
negotiation concept advises separating the factual from the relational level and therefore suggests that
problems at the relational level should not be solved with concessions on the factual level. Id. at 21–22.
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of such deceptions. This means that companies do not invest time and money to
uncover and pursue emotional deceptions. Generally, negotiators only attempt to
recognize such bluffs through attentive observation of the negotiation partner. Even
if this procedure may cause certain transaction costs, they are negligible. Rational
negotiators put a certain amount of energy into ignoring emotions about contentrelated questions. They try to make decisions about the contract object in a rational
rather than an emotional manner. However, this applies irrespective of whether the
emotions are real or fake, which is why such deceptions do not increase these costs.
Deceptions about emotions usually do not affect the BATNA and the ZOPA.
Regularly, such deceptions should only concern the distribution within ZOPA, provided there is one.217 Yet, in extreme cases, the excessive feigning of negative emotions can provoke the termination of negotiations and thereby prevent the conclusion of a socially desirable contract. Conversely, pretending positive emotions can
enlarge the negotiating pie in individual cases. Above all, appreciation can induce
the other side to present constructive proposals.218
There is little risk that such deceptions are detected, as only the deceiver knows
with certainty whether an emotion was real or merely faked. In cases of poorly
faked emotions, the other person may suspect but will never be able to demonstrate
the deception.219 Pareto-improving lies are perceived as less negative if the deceiver
demonstrates that he or she acted out of altruistic rather than selfish motives.220
A study conducted by Fulmer and others also hinted at the fact that bluffs about
emotions are generally considered less severe than deceptions about information. 221
From an economic perspective, this implies that the truth signal of the deceiver is
unlikely to be significantly diluted due to the lack of disclosure. However, for social
sanctions or alternative courses of action, it is not necessary to supply proof of the
lie. In these cases, a strong suspicion may be sufficient. Yet, it seems highly unlikely that such deceptions will be publicized on a large scale because such lies are
usually considered harmless.222 Hence, even where faked emotions are suspected,
the reputational loss should be minimal. This affirms the weak sanctioning character of making the lie public.
Moreover, even if the truth signal is weakened, honest negotiators will rarely
devote considerable resources to emphasizing the honesty of their emotions towards
dishonest negotiators. Most likely, honest negotiators will rely on the positive influence of their authenticity and will trust their counterparts to distinguish true from
false emotions. Also the spillover effect is not easily transferred to this situation,

217. If there is no ZOPA, the contract would not be concluded irrespective of the lie and hence, the lie
would also not result in any redistribution.
218. Fisher & Shapiro, supra note 207, at 25–51 (discussing generally the importance of appreciation
in contract negotiations).
219. Imagine a situation where negotiator A fakes his joy about a dinner invitation. Even if he tells his
colleague B that he lied about his feelings to the competitor, the testimony of B cannot prove the lie for
sure, because A could have also lied to B. Only A knows the truth and could potentially offer proof that
he lied. Even the reference to others’ emotions is usually not verifiable.
220. Daniel Shapiro, The Effects of Explanation on Negative Reactions to Deceit, 36 ADMI. SCI. Q.
614, 625 (1991).
221. Smithey Fulmer et al., supra note 210. The additional survey to the Siegen Study also points in
this direction (bluff about a negative emotion). Only a minority of the German students surveyed considered such a lie to be immoral, and even fewer students favored legal consequences.
222. See supra note 209. This is true even for faked (positive) emotions that were faked for selfish
rather than altruistic reasons.
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especially about negative emotions, because there might be psychological barriers
to also fake negative emotions like anger as a reaction.
However, positive emotions can have a significant spillover effect. Many people learn from a very young age that white lies are a successful strategy and therefore utilize them.223 White lies are closely related to deceptions about positive emotions. Hence, it is likely that people also learn early on, that faking positive emotions is a successful strategy. Yet, as demonstrated in the above, this would create
positive rather than negative effects regarding negotiations. Emotions are very personal, and no one wants to be coerced into revealing their true feelings. 224 On this
account, lies could also be legitimate if they concern particularly sensitive emotions,
as in these instances lying would serve to protect such personal information. 225
To conclude, such lies have either none or very limited negative economic effects. For this reason alone, a legal regulation appears unreasonable from an economic point of view even without viewing the comparison scenario.

2.

Comparison Scenario

A legal provision could not be enforced effectively. It would be extremely
difficult to prove faked emotions and to prove causality and if necessary, concrete
damages. This applies irrespective of the fact that rights and claims would probably
not be enforced, even in the absence of evidentiary difficulties, since it can be assumed that such deceptions are generally regarded as morally acceptable and people’s Rechtsgefühl suggests that there should not be legal consequences.226 Moreover, the only case that leads to significant negative consequences is the one in
which the lie about emotions leads to the break-off of the negotiations. However,
a right to rescind and contractual damages do not deal with this situation. Consequently, the negative effects of deception about emotions are relatively limited.
Even if one assumes some negative consequences, these could not be effectively
mitigated by legal rules.

D.

Deceptions About One’s Own BATNA

Deceptions often involve presenting one’s own negotiating position as stronger
than it is. Since the perceived BATNA decisively determines relative negotiating
power, lies about this aspect can prove to be a successful negotiation tactic. Parties
may lie about how good their alternatives are compared to the current negotiated
agreement in what is called èbetter offeræ or èintensified competitionæ tactics. 227

1.

Baseline Scenario

Since both BATNAs together determine the ZOPA or NOPA, these deceptions
generally affect the perceived zone of agreement. Feigning a better BATNA, may
223. See Talwar & Crossman, supra note 172, at 150-53 (on the learning process of children regarding
prosocial lies in detail).
224. Nyberg, supra note 10, at 128-36 (on lies and privacy).
225. See Section V.F. for a discussion of the reasoning how lies may protect the right to remain silent.
226. On the moral intuition, see supra note 208. Preliminary results regarding the Rechtsgefühl show
81.3% of German students and 100% of international professional negotiators are against legal rules.
227. Cf. Jung & Krebs, supra note 13, at 45-46.
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allow the deceiver to capture greater surplus, may cause negotiations to fail even
where there was a ZOPA, or may have no effect at all. If there is a ZOPA, the
exaggeration of one’s own BATNA can cause the existing ZOPA to appear narrower than it is. Under the assumption of rational negotiations, the economically
sensible contract is usually concluded nevertheless. However, the deception can
influence the distribution within the ZOPA.
If there is a ZOPA but the deceiver’s own BATNA is excessively exaggerated,
the parties may mistakenly assume that there is no ZOPA. If this is the case, there
is a risk that the negotiations will be terminated, even if the parties act rationally.
However, smart liars will leave a èwithdrawal optionæ open in negotiations. If they
realize that a reasonable conclusion of a contract within the ZOPA could fail due to
their lie, they often try to relativize the deception, while simultaneously saving face,
to reach an agreeable conclusion. Still, if the conclusion of the contract fails due to
the bluff, both parties are worse off than without the deception. In this respect, the
lie can cause a so-called èlose-loseæ situation. From a macroeconomic point of
view, such deceptions cause a decline in welfare-enhancing market transactions.
However, since there is no conclusion of a contract, a rescission is out of the question as are contractual claims for damages.
Finally, if there was no ZOPA, the consequence of exaggerating one’s BATNA
is that the lack of a ZOPA becomes even more evident. From an economic point of
view, such deceptions are not problematic because they have no significant impact
on the negotiations. These deceptions can lower transaction costs under certain
circumstances, as the negotiations may be terminated more quickly as a result of
the lie. In many cases, these deceptions will not become causal to the outcome of
the negotiations. Finally, as there is no conclusion of a contract, rescission and
damage claims would not be appropriate legal measures.
Lying about one’s own BATNA increases transaction costs on the side of the
liar since they must convincingly present a better offer. The cost of this can vary.
Non-specific oral statements require less effort than precise differentiated statements that may have to be substantiated. Yet, such deceptions incur transaction
costs for the party that fears a lie. Because of the potential distributive impacts, the
other party will take preventive measures and may also invest resources into clarification.
The moral evaluation of this type of lie varies widely.228 Some interviewed
groups classified it as clearly immoral while other groups were split. Overall a
noticeable dilution of the truth signal and a loss of trust can be expected. In some
of the surveyed groups, a substantial minority favored legal consequences.229 Some
spillover effects also seem plausible. If one side suspects a bluff about the BATNA,
it may react with a counter lie about their BATNA. Furthermore, the deceived side
might consider it legitimate to use less harmful bluffs. However, weaker parties

228. The results of the various groups surveyed in the U.S. and Germany for a lie about another offer
are as follows: U.S. lawyers (76% immoral), U.S. students (71.2% immoral), German professional negotiators (41% immoral), German lawyers (48% immoral), German judges (75% immoral), German students (59.9% immoral). Even fewer people regard a lie about a better offer as immoral.
229. The results of the various groups surveyed in the U.S. and Germany favoring a rescission for a lie
about another offer are as follows: U.S. lawyers (33%), U.S. students (43.3%), German professional
negotiators (18%), German lawyers (16%), German judges (28%), German students (36.6%). With regard to lying about a better offer, even fewer people are in favor of legal rules.
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could benefit from lies about the BATNA. Overall, it should be noted that misrepresenting a better BATNA can have certain negative consequences.

2.

Comparison Scenario

Legal regulations can only partly alleviate negative economic consequences.
For example, rescission and damage claims granted by contract law have no controlling effect if the entire conclusion of the contract fails on account of the lie. 230
Consequently, only tortious claims and criminal sanctions could be effective. In
many legal systems, however, the injured party would only be compensated for its
negative interest231 and often receives only partial compensation. Thus, the claiming party would not be in the same position as if the contract had been concluded.
Some negative effects also arise if the lie is not causal to the conclusion of the contract. Because lies about one’s BATNA do not result in the conclusion of a contract
outside of the ZOPA, only compensation claims should be granted, if at all.
There are also difficulties related to both, the disclosure and the presentation of
evidence, necessary for effective enforceability. This occurs because such information is only available to the deceiver and to the company that allegedly made the
better offer. In theory, both the exposure of the lie and gathering the evidence is
possible. However, the sense of lawfulness in most of the groups surveyed demonstrates that only a minority favored legal regulation.232 This supports the view that
the actual enforcement of such claims, even in the event of the disclosure of a lie,
would often not proceed. There are few, if any, cases in either the United States or
Germany, although this is assumed to be a very common tactic. 233 The actual controlling effect of the law would therefore be limited. However, the mere existence
of regulation would improve the negotiating position of the deceived party in any
subsequent negotiations or renegotiations. In order to influence the cost-benefit
ratio of this tactic significantly, legislatures would probably have to pose more severe sanctions, such as criminal sanctions. Overall, the misrepresentation of a better
BATNA is a category for which an economic analysis does not provide unambiguous results.

230. Something different only applies if a legal system is familiar with the instrument culpa in contrahendo and thereby includes corresponding deceptions.
231. This means that the damaged party would be put in the position as if he or she had never heard of
the lie.
232. The results of the various groups surveyed in the U.S. and Germany favoring a rescission for a lie
about another offer are as follows: U.S. lawyers (33%), U.S. students (43.3%), German professional
negotiators (18%), German lawyers (16%), German judges (28%), German students (36.6%). With regard to lying about a better offer, even fewer people are in favor of legal rules.
233. Studies on the actual use of this tactic are not available. However, it is an often-discussed tactic in
the literature, which suggests a certain frequency of its usage. In the B2C area, for example, one case
has become public in Germany: An online fashion store, Zalando SE, was sued in 2015 by the competition authorities based on a corresponding misrepresentation. Press Release, Peter Brammen,
Wettbewerbszentrale erhebt Klage gegen Zalando wegen irreführender Werbung, Zentrale zur
Bekämpfung
unlauteren
Wettbewerbs
(Nov.
11,
2015),
https://www.wettbewerbszentrale.de/de/home/_pressemitteilung/?id=268.
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CONCLUSION

This article explored the economic consequences and the immense complexity
of deceptions in business-to-business contract negotiations. The economic analysis
provided arguments for the lawmaker on how to handle lies in negotiations. However, other considerations, including moral, political, cultural, and primary legal
aspects also influence lawmakers.234
The Siegen Study suggested that lawmakers should not treat all lies equally.
Therefore, this article suggests differentiating between various types of lies, such
as lies about the subject matter of the contract, better offers, and emotions. Lawmakers should consider if and how the law can effectively mitigate the negative
effects of different types of lies. Types of lies focusing on the subject or price of
the contract result in clear economic disadvantages and the law can mitigate these
effects effectively. Conversely, some lies produce few negative economic effects
and it is even possible that some bluffs lead to marginally better outcomes. This is
the case for lies about emotions and the price in a broad sense. From an economic
point of view, lawmakers should not prohibit such lies. However, many lies lead to
mixed results between the two poles. Concerning those cases, the economic analysis does not provide conclusive indications on how a legal system should handle
such bluffs.

234. Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455, 456
(1978) (èThe legal system has very deep and powerful societal roots, and the values that it protects and
advances are responsive to many non-economic as well as economic values and concerns. (Â) Liberty,
freedom, and personal autonomy are ideals of the law, and they cannot be reduced to simple efficiency
considerations, however important efficiency may be in its own right.æ).
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